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BY INVITATION ONLY:
THE PROOF OF WELCOMENESS IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
MARY F. RADFORD*
Emerging as one of the most complex and controversial
legal issues of the decade, sexual harassment presents employers,
employees, lawmakers, and judges alike with a myriad of ques-
tions regarding the appropriate model of proof by which such
cases should be adjudged. Among the elements of any sexual
harassment suit is the welcomeness element, which questions
whether the plaintiff in any way consented to the conduct in ques-
tion. Under the current scheme, the burden falls on the plaintiff
to prove the unwelcomeness of the harassing conduct, thus creat-
ing a presumption of welcomeness as to the conduct alleged.
In this Article, Professor Mary Radford questions the valid-
ity of the current model of proof as to this element and proposes
an alternative paradigm by which welcomeness rather than un-
welcomeness should be proved in sexual harassment cases. After
discussing the evolution of the welcomeness element from early
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission pronouncements to
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson and subsequent decisions from the circuit courts
of appeals, Professor Radford analyzes the element in light of
current sociological and psychological studies of sexual harass-
ment. Rather than eliminate the welcomeness element entirely,
Professor Radford proposes two revisions to its current model of
proof. (1) a shift of the burden of proving welcomeness to the
defendant; and (2) a narrowing of the definition of the term to
exclude extraneous factors and limit the scope of inquiry to inter-
actions occurring solely between the plaintiff and defendant.
Professor Radford concludes that, by shifting the focus of sexual
harassment adjudication from the target to the aggressor, the re-
visions would more appropriately satisfy the aims of sexual har-
assment laws.
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Visualize a party given by your mother, a woman of above-average
social skills and grace. The first guest to arrive at her party, a former class-
mate, is a person well-liked by your mother, a person your mother informed
of the party in writing, an "invited" guest. Your mother's friend brings with
her another former classmate who happened to fly in that afternoon on an
unexpected business trip. This classmate was not invited to the party, but
your mother is pleased that she has come and consents immediately to her
joining the assembled group. The next person to arrive, your brother,
brings with him a date your mother finds both irritating and rude. Your
mother is not pleased about your brother's date, but, of course, will not turn
her away. Thus, your brother's date is a "tolerated" guest, but one your
mother would not have chosen. The last to arrive is your mother's own
sister, whom your mother has refused to see for years due to the sister's
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constant drunkenness. The sister is inebriated this night, so your mother
does not allow her to join the party-in other words, this guest is "re-
jected." Certainly, two of these guests, your brother's date and your
mother's sister, were not "welcome" guests from your mother's perspective.
Your brother, however, might later claim: "Of course my date was a wel-
come guest. Mom let her in, didn't she?" In light of these conflicting per-
spectives, if your mother ever had to prove in a court of law that she viewed
your brother's date as "unwelcome," would she be able to do so?
Sexual advances and conduct in the workplace appear in the same vari-
eties as these guests-some invited, some not invited but happily accepted,
some merely tolerated, and others actually rejected.' In attempts to concep-
tualize an appropriate model of proof in sexual harassment cases, three
questions arise: (1) which conduct should be considered actionable as sex-
ual harassment; (2) from whose perspective should the character of the con-
duct be judged; and (3) who should have the burden of proving whether the
conduct was welcomed? This Article focuses on the current law concerning
the third question and suggests an alternative paradigm for proving the pres-
ence or absence of welcomeness in a sexual harassment case.
One of the most complex work-related issues faced by employers, em-
ployees, lawmakers, and judges in the last decade,2 sexual harassment im-
plicates basic conflicts between the genders3 and exposes our individual and
societal neuroses about sexuality.4 Sexual harassment cases tend to be rid-
dled with stereotypical notions about the attitudes of each sex toward sexual
1. In one of the earliest sexual harassment cases to be decided by a circuit court of appeals,
Judge MacKinnon, in a concurring opinion, referred to "the distinction between invited, unin-
vited-but-welcome, offensive-but-tolerated, and flatly rejected advances" as being one that is diffi-
cult to discern. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring).
2. Since the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas hearings, focus by employers on sexual harass-
ment has become much more pronounced. In 1992, a poll of 160 New York area executives listed
sexual harassment as the third most important employment issue, after benefits and job security.
In a similar poll taken in 1990, sexual harassment had been ranked in fourteenth place. Four
Interesting Facts about Sexual Harassment, PnsRpEcrEs: A NawsLE'rER FOR AND ABOUT Wo-
MEN LAwYmis, Spring 1992, at 5.
3. Although some sexual harassment incidents involve harassment of an employee by a
person of the same gender, the vast majority of incidents involve harassment perpetrated by a
person of one gender (usually male) on a person of the other gender (usually female). See U.S.
MEarr SYsrnms PRoTErioN BOARD OFmcE OF Mar SYsTmas REvmw AND STUDms, SExUAL
HARASSmENT N THE FEDERAL WoR PLAC: IS IT A PROBLEM? 9 (1981) [hereinafter Mr
SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD STUDY].
4. One commentator likens the development of attitudes toward sexual harassment to the
development of attitudes toward rape and wife abuse-that is, as a form of victimization that has
recently been "redefined as a social rather than a personal problem." Stephanie Riger, Gender
Dilemmas in Sexual Harassment Policies and Procedures, 46 AMmUCAN PSYCHOLOGIST 497, 497
(1991). For an interesting discussion of the interaction between the law and current societal
norms about sexuality, see Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual
Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 780-84, 801-10 (1988).
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interaction, presumptions about what workers should expect in a "normal"
working environment, and lingering doubts about holding an employer lia-
ble for actions that might have been characterized as mere "horseplay" a
few years before.
A myriad of questions about the appropriate legal approach to sexual
harassment remain unanswered, the most pressing of which include the fol-
lowing: If a bisexual employer harasses both male and female employees,
do such actions constitute discrimination on the basis of sex? 5 Are intimi-
dating actions that are not related to sexual desires truly sexual harass-
ment?6 At what point do actions become "sufficiently severe and
pervasive" to constitute a hostile working environment?7 Should the stan-
dard for determining the severity of actions be a subjective or an objective
one?8 Should the perspective be that of the reasonable man, the reasonable
woman, or the reasonable person? 9 When should an employer be deemed
5. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1lth Cir. 1982); Barnes, 561
F.2d at 987 n.55; Richard A. Epstein, FORBIDDEN GROuiNs: THE CAsE AAmNsT EMPLOYMENT
DiSCRMINAnON LAWS 357-59 (1992); Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimina-
tion: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 333, 346-53 (1990).
6. See, e.g., Joshua F. Thorpe, Note, Gender-Based Harassment and the Hostile Work Envi-
ronment, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1361, passim.
7. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986), the Supreme Court, citing
the Guidelines issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, described two catego-
ries of sexual harassment: quid pro quo harassment, in which the request for sexual favors is
directly linked to an economic or other tangible job benefit; and "hostile environment" harass-
ment, which creates a hostile or intimidating work environment or otherwise unreasonably inter-
feres with the plaintiff's work performance. The Court confirmed that the latter type of sexual
harassment is actionable only if it is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of
[the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment."' Id. at 67 (quoting
Henson, 682 F.2d at 904). For discussions of hostile environment sexual harassment, see gener-
ally Dawn D. Bennett-Alexander, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: A Clearer View, 42
LAB. L3. 131 (1991); Sharon T. Bradford, Relieffor Hostile Work Environment Discrimination:
Restoring Title VII's Remedial Powers, 99 YALE LJ. 1611 (1990); Nicol6 D. Rizzolo, A Right
with Questionable Bite: The Future of "Abusive or Hostile Work Environment" Sexual Harass-
ment as a Cause of Action for Women in a Gender-Based Society and Legal System, 23 NEv ENo.
L. Rev. 263 (1988).
8. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
9. For contrasting approaches to this issue, see id, at 879 (adopting a reasonable woman
standard) and Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying a reason-
able person standard), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). See also Kathryn Abrams, Gender
Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1183-1200
(1989) (rejecting a reasonable person standard, but noting the limits of a reasonable woman stan-
dard that is not based on a careful elaboration of the differences between men and women); Nancy
S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual
Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1231-34 (1990) (criticizing the reasonable person test as
perpetuating an unequal status quo for women); Howard A. Simon, Ellison v. Brady: A "Reason-
able Woman" Standard for Sexual Harassment, 17 Emp.oYm REL. LJ. 71, 78-79 (1991) (arguing
that the Ninth Circuit's adoption of the reasonable woman standard will likely result in increased
sexual harassment complaints and employer liability); Steven H. Winterbauer, Sexual Harass-
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to have received notice of a sexual harassment problem?"° Does sexual
harassment fall more logically into the category of tortious activity, such as
invasion of privacy and the intentional infliction of emotional distress, than
of sex discrimination?" Are there First Amendment ramifications to limit-
ing sexual speech in the workplace?' 2 To add to the confusion surrounding
these legal issues, a number of recent sociological and psychological studies
report findings relating to perceptions about sexual harassment that directly
conflict with the presumptions utilized in the current law.
The uncertainty engendered by unanswered legal questions and con-
flicting sociological findings frustrates our society as it struggles to deal
with sexual harassment in a manner that respects the rights of plaintiffs,
alleged harassers, and employers. Even more troubling, however, the very
definition accorded to the term "sexual harassment" by the legal system 3
reflects a core misunderstanding of the problem.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Guide-
lines' 4 offer the following definition of sexual harassment:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's em-
ployment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
ment-The Reasonable Woman Standard, 7 LAB. LAw. 811, 819-21 (1991) (discussing steps em-
ployers can take to limit liability for sexual harassment under the reasonable woman standard).
10. See, e.g., Martha Sperry, Note, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and the Imposi-
tion of Liability Without Notice: A Progressive Approach to Traditional Gender Roles and Power
Based Relationships, 24 NEw ENG. L. Rev. 917, 945-48 (1990).
11. See, e.g., EpsamN, supra note 5, at 352-57; Paul, supra note 5, at 359-65; Sarah E. Wald,
Alternatives to Title VII: State Statutory and Common-Law Remedies for Employment Discrimi-
nation, 5 HLv. WoMEN's L.J. 35 (1982); Benson A. Wolman, Verbal Sexual Harassment on the
Job as Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 17 CAP. U. L. Rev. 24-5, 254-71 (1988); Krista
J. Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace,
134 U. PA. L. Rev. 1461, 1474-85 (1986).
12. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harass-
ment and the First Amendment, 52 Omio ST. LJ. 481, 491-544 (1991); Amy Horton, Comment,
Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual Harassment, the First Amendment, and the
Contours of Title VII, 46 U. MiAM L. Rev. 403, 410-36 (1991).
13. The term "legal system" is used to refer to the body of lawmakers, administrative agen-
cies, judges, and lawyers who are involved in making, interpreting, and enforcing the law as it
relates to sexual harassment.
14. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991) [hereinafter EEOC Guidelines]. See infra notes 38-43 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the general status of EEOC guidelines and other pronounce-
ments. For a general discussion of these Guidelines, see Robert W. Martin, Jr., EEOC's New
Sexual Harassment Guidelines: Civility in the Workplace, 5 NOVA L. REv. 405 (1981); Lynn
McLain, The EEOC Sexual Harassment Guidelines: Welcome Advances under Title VII? 10 U.
BALT. L. Rev. 275 (1981); J. Clay Smith, Jr., Prologue to the EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Har-
assment, 10 CAP. U. L. REv. 471 (1981).
1994]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.' 5
By including the term "unwelcome" in the definition of sexual harassment,
the EEOC Guidelines characterize unwelcomeness as an element of the
plaintiff's cause of action and place on the plaintiff the burden of proving
the unwelcomeness of the conduct in question. 6 In other words, unless the
target of the sexual conduct is able to prove otherwise, the court must find
that the conduct in question was welcome.
The stated rationale for the unwelcomeness element of the definition
of sexual harassment is that it is difficult to distinguish harassing sexual
conduct from conduct that occurs simply because "sexual attraction may
often play a role in the day-to-day social exchange between employees."17
Superficially, this rationale resembles that for including an "offensiveness"
element in the definition of battery. A battery plaintiff is required to prove
that the disputed contact was offensive because "in a crowded world, a cer-
tain amount of personal contact is inevitable, and must be accepted."' 8 In
other words, physical contact that is deemed "normal" in that it is likely to
occur between persons in day-to-day life is not presumed to be actionable
battery, just as, under the EEOC's definition of sexual harassment, sexual
contact in the workplace that is deemed to be a "normal" part of an em-
ployee's daily life is not actionable sexual harassment.
Many courts have accepted, virtually without comment, the rationale
for forcing a plaintiff to prove unwelcomeness in a sexual harassment
case. 9 Yet this rationale ignores an important distinction between sexual
harassment and the physical contact that underlies torts such as assault and
battery. While physical contact may be inevitable and normal in a crowded
world, sexual advances in the workplace need not be an inevitable aspect of
a gender-integrated work environment and will only be characterized as
15. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 14 (emphasis added). As noted supra in note 7, the
Supreme Court derived two categories of sexual harassment from this definition: quid pro quo
harassment and hostile environment harassment. See Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sex-
ual Harassment, EEOC Notice N-915-050, at 2-3 (March 19, 1990) [hereinafter EEOC Policy
Guidance].
16. In Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982), the Eleventh Circuit stated
that among the elements of her prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that she "was subject to
unwelcome sexual harassment." Id. at 903. As will be discussed in Part I infra at text accompa-
nying notes 63-66, 85-94, this characterization of the prima facie case has been adopted by almost
every other Circuit, and the Supreme Court of the United States has stated that the plaintiff has the
burden of proving the unwelcomeness of the conduct.
17. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 15, at 7.
18. W. PAGE KEEMN ET AL., PRossER AND KEMON ON anm LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 42 (5th
ed. 1984).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 85-94.
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"normal" if machismo is used as the measuring standard of normalcy.2'
Requiring the "target" of sexual conduct21 to prove that such conduct is
unwelcome perpetuates the myth that most people are not offended by at-
tention of a sexual iature in the workplace.22 As most targets of sexual
harassment tend to be women, the perpetuation of this myth contradicts
accepted sociological and psychological findings about women's attitudes
toward sexual attention at work.' An alternative scheme more reflective of
these attitudes should therefore be considered.
This Article proposes one such alternative, a paradigm by which wel-
comeness rather than unwelcomeness should be proved in sexual harass-
ment cases. A reallocation of the burden of proving welcomeness24 would
provide a more consistent and realistic approach for the general law of har-
assment. First, the proposed paradigm for proving sexual harassment
would more accurately reflect the realities of behavior that are demonstrated
in sociological and psychological studies of workers' reactions to sexual
attention in the workplace Second, the method of proof in sexual harass-
ment cases would be more consistent with the allocation of burdens in gen-
eral Title VII law.26 Third, the definition of sexual harassment would more
closely resemble the definitions of actionable racial and ethnic harassment,
which do not require the target of the harassment to prove that the verbal or
physical conduct was unwelcome. 7
In addition to shifting the burden so as to require an alleged harasser to
prove that his conduct was welcome (that is, it was actively solicited or
freely consented to), the proposed paradigm for proving welcomeness must
also include a refined definition of that term.2" Under the refined defini-
tion, silence or a polite refusal in reaction to harassing conduct could not be
recharacterized by the alleged harasser as signs of consent.29 Furthermore,
20. The author has purposely chosen not to refer to "male" attitudes toward sexual harass-
ment and sexuality, but rather to use the term "machismo" because the latter term better expresses
the exaggerated sense of aggression and arrogance that seems to pervade the conduct at issue in
many of the sexual harassment cases described in this Article.
21. The term "target" will be used throughout this Article instead of the more commonly
used term "victim" in an attempt to help diffuse the perennial stereotype of women as victims.
22. As noted, the requirement of proving "offensiveness" in a battery claim is based on the
presumption that most of the physical contact which occurs in the everyday world is not offensive.
The requirement of proving welcomeness would seem to have a similar theoretical basis.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 147-48.
24. Discussion of this reallocation of the burden of proving welcomeness appears infra notes
159-89 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 131-56 and accompanying text (discussing sociological and psychological
studies).
26. See infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
27. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 190-212 and accompanying text.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 200-01.
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the only interactions to which the harasser could point in proving that his
conduct was welcome would be the interactions between the harasser and
the target. Finally, the target's failure to file a contemporaneous formal
complaint would have no bearing on the welcomeness issue.
This Article examines in Part I the evolution of the unwelcomeness
requirement, from early EEOC pronouncements to the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson3" and subsequent decisions from
the circuit courts of appeals. 31 Part II analyzes the unwelcomeness require-
ment in the context of current sociological and psychological studies of
sexual harassment. Part III discusses the proposed paradigm and addresses
the ramifications of its implementation, concluding with a discussion of
why the welcomeness inquiry should not be eliminated completely.
I. JuDicILm AND AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
UNwELcoMENEss REQUIREMENT
A. Sexual Harassment as a Violation of Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196432 makes it an "unlawful em-
ployment practice" for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.""3
There is little legislative history describing the scope of the prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of sex because the term "sex was added
as a last-minute floor amendment in the House of Representatives. 4 Early
court decisions addressing whether sexual harassment should be treated as
unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII determined that it should not.3"
30. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
31. See infra notes 85-130 and accompanying text.
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1988).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
34. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 63-64. It has been argued that "sex" was added as a ploy by southern
male Congressmen in an unsuccessful attempt to scuttle the entire bill. See Kerri Weisel, Com-
ment, Title VII: Legal Protection Against Sexual Harassment, 53 WASH. L. Rnv. 123, 123 n.1
(1977).
35. See Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 235-36 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd on
other grounds, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161,
163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). For a discussion of these and other
early cases which refused to find that sexual harassment violated Title VII, see Michael D. Vhay,
The Harms of Asking: Towards a Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. Cm. L.
Rnv. 328, 329-33 (1988).
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In 1976 with the case of Williams v. Saxbe,36 however, courts began to
recognize sexual harassment claims as violative of Title VI.
37
In 1980, the EEOC38 issued a set of Guidelines which stated unequivo-
cally that "[h]arassment on the basis of sex is a violation of... title VII.
'39
The Guidelines defined this harassment to include "unwelcome sexual ad-
vances, requests for sexual favors, or physical conduct of a sexual na-
ture."40 The Guidelines spoke of two forms of sexual harassment:
harassment to which an employee must submit as a condition for receiving
certain benefits41 and harassment that "has the purpose or effect of unrea-
sonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."'42 These forms of
harassment have since been referred to as "quid pro quo" harassment and
"hostile working environment" harassment.4 3
In 1982, in Henson v. City of Dundee,' the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit interpreted the EEOC Guidelines when it listed "unwel-
come sexual harassment" as the second of five elements that "the plaintiff
must allege and prove ... in order to establish her claim" of sexual harass-
ment.45 The Henson court defined "unwelcomeness," stating that the "con-
duct must be unwelcome in the sense that the employee did not solicit or
36. 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Williams v.
Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
37. For a discussion of the Williams case and other early cases recognizing sexual harass-
ment as a violation of Title VII, see Vhay, supra note 35, at 334-38. For a discussion of tort
theories and constitutional theories for bringing sexual harassment claims, see CHAR.ES A. Suaiu-
vAN Er AL., EMPLoYmENT DISCRIMINrAON 356-57 nn.4-5 (1988).
38. The EEOC, which was created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, has the authority to
promulgate regulations designed to aid in the enforcement of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4,
2000e-12(a) (1988).
39. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 14, § 1604.11(a). EEOC regulations are generally given
deference by courts when interpreting Title VII. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 65 (1986); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). For further discussion of
the EEOC Guidelines and their use by courts, see Matthew C. Hesse & Lester J. Hubble, Note,
The Dehumanizing Puzzle of Sexual Harassment: A Survey of the Law Concerning Harassment of
Women in the Workplace, 24 WAsriuR LJ. 574, 586-95 (1985); Lynn McLain, The EEOC
Harassment Guidelines: Welcome Advances under Title VII?, 10 U. BALT. L. REv. 275, 286-88
(1981).
40. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 14, § 1604.11(a). See supra text accompanying note 15
for the complete definition.
41. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 14, § 1604.11(a)(1)-(2).
42. Id. § 1604.11(a)(3).
43. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65-67; supra note 7.
44. 682 F.2d 897 (1lth Cir. 1982).
45. Id. at 903. According to the Henson court, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie claim by
proving that: (1) she belonged to a group protected by Title VII; (2) she was subject to unwel-
come sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment affected a term,
condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action (respondeat superior). Id. at 903-05.
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incite it, and in the sense that the employee regarded the conduct as undesir-
able or offensive."'
B. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
In 1986, the Supreme Court of the United States discussed "un-
welcomeness" in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,47 the first case in which
the Court addressed sexual harassment issues. In that case, Mechelle Vin-
son charged "hostile work environment" sexual harassment48 against the
bank for which she had worked for several years.49 Vinson admitted that
she had carried on a sexual affair with a bank vice president during that
time.50 She claimed, however, that she initially submitted to the affair be-
cause she feared losing her job.51 She also alleged that the vice president
subsequently subjected her to repeated public humiliation of a sexual nature
and even raped her on more than one occasion.52 The bank and the vice
president denied all of these allegations. 53  The district court determined
46. Id. at 903. Some circuit courts of appeals that have adopted this definition have (perhaps
unwittingly) changed the verb "incite" to the verb "invite" when they articulated the definition.
See infra text accompanying note 90.
47. 477 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1986). For general discussions of the Vinson case, see Dawn Ben-
nett-Alexander, The Supreme Court Finally Speaks on the Issue of Sexual Harassment-What Did
It Say?, 10 WoMmN's RTs. L. REP. 65 (1987); Grace M. Dodier, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson:
Sexual Harassment at Work, 10 HARv. WomEN's L.J. 302 (1987); Sheryl A. Greene, Reevaluation
of Title VII Abusive Environment Claims Based on Sexual Harassment After Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 13 T. MARsHALL L. REv. 29 (1987-88); David Holtzman & Eric Trelz, Recent
Developments in the Law of Sexual Harassment: Abusive Environment Claims After Meritor Sav-
ings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 31 ST. Louis U. L.. 239 (1987); Janet Selden, Employer Liability for
"Hostile Environment" Sexual Harassment, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 31 How. L.J. 51
(1988); Ronald Turner, Employer Liability Under Title Vlfor Hostile Environment Sexual Har-
assment by Supervisory Personnel: The Impact and Aftermath of Meritor Savings Bank, 33 How.
L.J. 1 (1990).
48. For descriptions of the term "hostile work environment," see supra note 7.
In October 1993, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down a decision in Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). In this case, the Court looked again at the definition
of "hostile work environment" within the context of a Title VII sexual harassment case, holding
that the conduct in question need not cause actual psychological injury to the target in order to be
actionable. l at *4. The Court reiterated the definition it laid down in Vinson-that is, that the
conduct be "so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees
because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin." Id. at *3. The Court enumerated
factors that should be examined when determining the "hostile nature of the environment." These
factors include "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee's work performance." The Harris Court pointed out, however, that "no single
factor is required." Id. at *4. The Court did not address the welcomeness issue.
49. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 60.
50. Id. at 59-60.
51. Id. at 60.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 61.
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that, even if the sexual conduct occurred, Vinson engaged in a "voluntary"
relationship such that the conduct did not constitute sexual harassment.
54
Filing an amaicus curiae brief, the EEOC argued that the district court's
conclusion that Vinson was not a victim of sexual harassment should be
sustained.55 The EEOC based its position on the district court's finding that
the sexual relationship was "voluntary."56 From this, the EEOC concluded
that the relationship was "consensual" and thus the vice president's "ad-
vances (if any) were not unwelcome."5" The EEOC distinguished racial
harassment and sexual harassment, stating that "[w]hereas racial slurs are
intrinsically offensive and presumptively unwelcome, sexual advances and
innuendo are ambiguous: depending on their context, they may be intended
by the initiator, and perceived by the recipient, as denigrating or compli-
mentary, as threatening or welcome, as malevolent or innocuous."58s The
EEOC emphasized that "[s]exual attraction is a fact of life" that "may often
play a role in the day-to-day social exchange between employees in the
workplace."5 9 The EEOC further argued that Title VII rules must be care-
fully crafted so as not to "intrude on 'purely personal, social
relationship[s].' "60
The Supreme Court found, as the Eleventh Circuit had, that the case
should be remanded because the district court's findings had been based on
erroneous views of the law.6 The Vinson Court stated that the district court
mistakenly focused on the fact that Vinson's sexual relationship with the
vice president was "voluntary."62 The Court wrote that, instead of volunta-
riness, "[t]he gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged
sexual advances were 'unwelcome.' .. . The correct inquiry is whether re-
spondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were
54. Id.
55. Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as
Amici Curiae at E-6, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979), re-
printed in Daily Labor Report (BNA) No. 241, at E-1 (Dec. 16, 1985) [hereinafter EEOC BrieJ].
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at E-5.
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting Preamble to Interim Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, 45 Fed. Reg. 25024
(1980)). This language later appeared in the EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 15, which was
issued by the EEOC after the Vinson case was decided. For a discussion of the EEOC Policy
Guidance, see infra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
61. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67-69 (1986). The Supreme Court stated
first that a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment could lie even absent a tangible eco-
nomic effect on the complaining party's employment. Id. at 68. Quoting the Henson case, the
Court added that a hostile working environment claim was not actionable unless the conduct was
"sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create
an abusive working enviromnent."' Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
62. Id. at 68.
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unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was
voluntary."'6 The Court acknowledged that "the question whether the par-
ticular conduct was indeed unwelcome presents difficult problems of proof
and turns largely on credibility determinations committed to the trier of
fact." '  The Court indicated that evidence of "a complainant's sexually
provocative speech or dress" is "obviously relevant" in such determina-
tions.6 5 As the Court further noted, the "EEOC Guidelines emphasize that
the trier of fact must determine the existence of sexual harassment in light
of 'the record as a whole' and 'the totality of circumstances, such as the
nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents
occurred."' 66 After determining that the job of the district court was to
decide whether the introduction of evidence of this type resulted in such a
potential for unfair prejudice as to outweigh its relevance,67 the Court con-
cluded that "there is no per se rule against" the admissibility of such
evidence.68
The Vinson Court did not address directly the allocation of the burden
of proving that the conduct in question was unwelcome or welcome. In
fact, when discussing the issue of voluntariness, the Court used terminology
indicating that it was discussing a proffered defense to the sexual harass-
ment claim rather than an element of the claim that must be proved as part
of the prima facie case of the complaining party.69 When discussing wel-
comeness itself, however, the Court indicated that there was an actual af-
firmative requirement that the plaintiff prove at trial that she had shown "by
her conduct ... that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome."7
63. Id. This statement by the Court is virtually a verbatim adoption of a statement made by
the EEOC in its amicus curiae brief, which argued that "[t]he gravamen of any hostile environ-
ment claim must be that the alleged sexual advances are 'unwelcome."' EEOC Brief, supra note
55, at E-5. The EEOC cited its own Guidelines as authority for this statement. Id.
64. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68.
65. Id. at 69.
66. Id. (quoting EEOC Guidelines, supra note 14). In its brief, the EEOC pointed out that
the district court had not mentioned Ms. Vinson's dress or conduct, but that the court of appeals
had inferred that the district court judge may have based his findings on testimony about Ms.
Vinson's dress and personal fantasies. EEOC Brief, supra note 55, at E-6, The EEOC empha-
sized that the district court's findings were based on other things, such as the fact that Ms. Vinson
had never reported the alleged rapes, even to her family or friends. Id.
67. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 69.
68. Id.
69. But the fact that sex-related conduct was 'voluntary,' in the sense that the complain-
ant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual harassment
suit .... While "voluntariness" in the sense of consent is not a defense to such a claim,
it does not follow that a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is irrelevant
as a matter of law in determining whether he or she found particular sexual advances
unwelcome. To the contrary, such evidence is obviously relevant.
Id. at 68-69.
70. Id. at 68.
[Vol. 72
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
C. Post-Vinson Response by the EEOC
In the eighteen months following the release of the Vinson opinion, the
EEOC drafted a "guidance memorandum" ("EEOC Policy Guidance")
designed to define sexual harassment and employer liability "in light of
recent cases."'" The memorandum devotes substantial attention to
"[d]etermining [w]hether [s]exual [c]onduct [i]s [u]nwelcome."72 This
section of the EEOC Policy Guidance begins by repeating the original defi-
nition of sexual harassment-"unwelcome... verbal or physical conduct of
a sexual nature" 73-then quotes the Henson definition of "unwelcome con-
duct" as that which the complaining party "did not solicit or incite ...
[and] the employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive."'74 In
the guise of guidance to its field officers, the EEOC provides in the Policy
Guidance a set of "pointers" for targets of sexual harassment. The EEOC
Policy Guidance states that "victims are well-advised to assert their right to
a workplace free from sexual harassment. This may stop the harassment
before it becomes more serious."'75 According to the EEOC Policy Gui-
dance, a contemporaneous complaint is not a necessary element to a sexual
harassment claim, but it may provide "persuasive evidence that the sexual
harassment in fact occurred as alleged" particularly if "there is some indica-
tion of welcomeness or when the credibility of the parties is at issue. 76
Importantly, the EEOC Policy Guidance insists that if a complaint was not
made, "the investigation must ascertain why.""
The EEOC Policy Guidance contains a lengthy discussion on how to
determine whether the target's conduct was "consistent, or inconsistent,
with her assertion that the sexual conduct [was] unwelcome."7" Citing pri-
marily district court cases and EEOC decisions, the memorandum requires
that targets of sexual harassment bear an affirmative burden "to communi-
71. Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, EEOC Notice No. 915-035
was issued on October 25, 1988 and was replaced on March 19, 1990 with a Notice of the same
name. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 15. The latter document (which contained no changes
from the original Notice in the portions relevant to this Article) is cited herein.
In 1993, the EEOC issued proposed Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Reli-
gion, Gender, National Origin, Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51266 (1993) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1609) (proposed Oct. 1, 1993). These proposed Guidelines, which deal with harassment
based on gender-other than sexual harassment, are discussed infra text accompanying note 187.
72. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 15, at 1.
73. Id. at 7 (quoting EEOC Guidelines, supra note 14).
74. Id. (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982)). As was
noted, supra text accompanying note 45, the Henson court considered unwelcomeness as a prong
of the complaining party's prima facie case.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 8.
78. Id. at 9-11.
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cate that the conduct is unwelcome. 79 While noting that acquiescence
alone may not in and of itself prove welcomeness, the EEOC points out that
a court should not look at "subjective, uncommunicated feelings" when de-
termining unwelcomeness, but rather the Policy Guidance advises the
courts to look to "objective evidence" that the target actually conveyed that
the conduct was unwelcome.80 Similarly, the EEOC sends a conflicting
message by stating that the "occasional use of sexually explicit language
does not necessarily negate a claim that sexual conduct was unwelcome,"
while devoting considerable discussion to those cases in which the plain-
tiff's claim was barred because she acted "in a sexually aggressive manner,
using sexually oriented language, or soliciting sexual conduct."8'
The EEOC Policy Guidance addresses specifically the situation in
which "an employee first willingly participates in conduct of a sexual na-
ture but then ceases to participate and claims that any continued sexual
conduct has created a hostile work environment."82 In this case, the target
"must clearly notify the alleged harasser that his conduct is no longer wel-
come."8 3 In addition, the memorandum points out that a complaining party
who uses offensive language or tells crude jokes in a "consensual" setting
may still bring a charge of sexual harassment so long as she told the alleged
harasser to leave her alone.
84
Despite the somewhat confusing "defense" language in Vinson, the
combination of the Vinson opinion and the EEOC Policy Guidance clearly
indicates that the Supreme Court and the EEOC believe that the target of
sexual advances or conduct may not successfully bring an action for sexual
harassment unless she can prove that she clearly indicated to the alleged
79. Id. at 7.
80. Id. at 9 n.10 (citing Ukarish v. Magnesium Electron, 33 EPD Para. 34,087 (D.N.J. 1983),
in which the complaining party had written in her diary that she did not welcome the sexual
verbiage, but had "made no objection and indeed appeared to join in 'as one of the boys."'). This
footnote also cites Sardigal v. St. Louis Nat. Stockyards Co., 41 EPD Para. 36,613 (S.D. I11. 1986),
in which the plaintiff lost her case because she had visited the alleged harasser in the hospital and
allowed him to come into her home at night. Perhaps eager to repeat its faith in the district court's
opinion in Vinson, the EEOC also points out in this footnote that the district court had found that
Vinson had twice refused to be transferred to an office away from the alleged harasser.
81. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 15, at 9-11 (citing Ferguson v, E.I. DuPont
deNemours & Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Del. 1983); Gan v. Kepro Circuit Systems, 27 EPD
Para. 32,379 (E.D. Mo. 1982); Reichman v. Bureau of Affirmative Action, 536 F. Supp. 1149
(M.D. Pa. 1982)).
82. EEOC Policy Evidence, supra note 15, at 9-10.
83. Id. at 10 (citing Loftin-Boggs v. City of Meridian, 633 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D. Miss. 1986),
aff'd without opinion, 824 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1987); Commission Decision 84-1, CCH Employ-
ment Practices Guide 6839). Loftin-Boggs involved plaintiffs who initially participated in using
crude language and telling vulgar jokes and were later barred from bringing sexual harassment
claims on the grounds that they had given the impression that the conduct was welcome. Lof-
tin-Boggs, 633 F. Supp. at 1324-25.
84. EEOC Policy Guidance supra note 15, at 10-11.
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harasser the unwelcomeness of his conduct. Post-Vinson cases decided by
the courts of appeals indicate that a majority of these courts have adopted
this approach.
D. Post-Vinson Cases from the Circuit Courts of Appeals
In the years following Vinson, the unwelcomeness element of a sexual
harassment claim was cited by judges in eleven of the thirteen circuit courts
of appeals." Of these, seven circuits 6 expressly adopted some or all of the
85. These circuits are the First Circuit, see Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777,
782-83 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (lst Cir.
1988) (using unwelcomeness as part of the definition of sexual harassment in a claim under Title
IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, § 901 et seq., 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 et seq.); the
Second Circuit, see Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 578 (2d Cir. 1989); the
Fourth Circuit, see Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated in part on
reh'g, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990); Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987); the
Fifth Circuit, see Collins v. Baptist Memorial Geriatric Ctr., 937 F.2d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 968 (1992); Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 477 (5th
Cir. 1989); Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Wyerick v. Bayou
Steel Corp., 887 F.2d 1271, 1274 (5th Cir. 1989) (using the same analysis for a case brought under
the Louisiana state-law counterpart to Title VI); the Sixth Circuit, see Yates v. Avco Corp., 819
F.2d 630, 634 (6th Cir. 1987); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619 (6th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); the Seventh Circuit, see Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d
412, 418 (7th Cir. 1989); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 213 (7th Cir. 1986); see
also Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1271 (7th Cir. 1991) (involving a racial harass-
ment case in which the court stated that it was not going to adopt a "multifactor test [such as the
Henson test] that has the potential for a mechanical application which overlooks or under-
emphasizes the most important feature of the harassment inquiry" but instead would evaluate
harassment claims "against both the objective and subjective standard"); the Eighth Circuit, see
Bums v. McGregor Elecs. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 1993); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co.,
Inc., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1988); Moylan v. Manies County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir.
1986); the Ninth Circuit, see Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1991); EEOC v.
Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515 (9th Cir. 1989); Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1373 (9th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Jordan v. Hodel, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989); the Tenth Circuit, see
Baker v. Weyerhauser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1345 (10th Cir. 1990); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833
F.2d 1406, 1411 (10th Cir. 1987); the Eleventh Circuit, see Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.,
830 F.2d 1554, 1557 (11th Cir. 1987)); and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, see Carosella v.
United States Postal Serv., 816 F.2d 638, 639 (Fed. Cir. 1987). No sexual harassment cases that
list the elements of the claim have been decided by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit since Vinson.
86. These include courts of appeals for the First Circuit, see Chamberlin, 915 F.2d at 782-83;
Fourth Circuit, see Paroline, 879 F.2d at 105; Swentek, 830 F.2d at 557; Fifth Circuit, see Collins,
937 F.2d at 195; Waltman, 875 F.2d at 477; Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d at 719; Sixth Circuit,
see Yates, 819 F.2d at 634; Eighth Circuit, see Burns, 989 F.2d at 962; Hall, 842 F.2d at 1013;
Moylan, 792 F.2d at 749; Ninth Circuit, see Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d at 1515 (adopting a
three-part test, rather than the Henson five-part test, requiring the plaintiff to show that "1) she
was subjected to sexual factors, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature, (2) that this conduct was unwelcome, and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create a hostile working
environment"); Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d at 1373 (same); Ellison, 924 F.2d at 875 (same); and
Eleventh Circuit, see Sparks, 830 F.2d at 1557.
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prima facie case requirements set out in Henson, 7 including the require-
ment that the plaintiff prove unwelcomeness 8 Additionally, two circuits
adopted the Henson definition of "unwelcome" conduct-that is, conduct
that the plaintiff did not "solicit or incite" and that the plaintiff regarded as
"undesirable or offensive." 9 Two other circuits adopted virtually the same
definition, although these courts substituted the word "invite" for "incite."9
Similarly, one circuit described unwelcome conduct as conduct that was
"not solicited and not desired." 91 Another circuit focused on trial court
findings that the alleged harasser's conduct was "neither invited nor en-
couraged"'9  and "never welcomed."93 One circuit examined sexual harass-
ment claims after Vinson but used a framework that differs from the Henson
framework and did not include the EEOC unwelcomeness requirement.
94
Courts that have cited the unwelcomeness requirement generally agree
that unwelcomeness is a question of fact.95 These courts also concede that
87. For a discussion of these requirements, see supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
88. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, without citing Henson, has also adopted the
requirement that the plaintiff prove the conduct was unwelcome. Carrero, 890 F.2d at 578.
89. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 847, 903 (1lth Cir. 1982); see also Waltman, 875
F.2d at 477; Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d at 719; Sparks, 830 F.2d at 1557.
90. See Chamberlin, 915 F.2d at 784; Hall, 842 F.2d at 1014; Moylan, 792 F.2d at 749, For
a description of the Eighth Circuit's most recent discussion of how "unwelcome" should be de-
fined, see infra text accompanying notes 114-20.
91. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 633 (6th Cir. 1987). The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has decided only one sexual harassment case since Vinson. In that case, the court
of appeals merely quoted the EEOC definition without comment as to the unwelcomeness feature.
Carosella v. United States Postal Serv., 816 F.2d 638, 640 (Fed. Cir. 1987). However, the Court
did make note of the Postal Service's 1980 sexual harassment policy, which referred to actions
such as "unsolicited verbal comments ... [and other conduct] which are unwelcome to the recipi-
ent." Id. at 639 (emphasis added).
92. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1411 (10th Cir. 1987).
93. Baker v. Weyerhauser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1345 (10th Cir. 1990).
94. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990). The Andrews
court listed the following five requirements for proving a hostile work environment claim: "(1) the
employees suffered intentional discrimination because of their sex; (2) the discrimination was
pervasive and regular, (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimi-
nation would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that position; and (5) the
existence of respondeat superior liability." Id.; see also Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904
F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1990) (involving a claim that the sexual relationship between another employee
and the supervisor created a hostile working environment for the plaintiff). In Drinkwater, the
court initially noted that "EEOC guidelines are accorded deference in harassment discrimination
cases," 904 F.2d at 859 n.10, and cited Henson and Vinson in its list of background cases, id. at
859 n. 11, but then went on to adopt the Andrews test, id. at 860.
95. For example, in Wyerick v. Bayou Steel Corp., 887 F.2d 1271, 1275 (5th Cir. 1989), the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendant, finding that "[tihe intensely factual inquiry anticipated by the Court in Meritor re-
quires the issue of unwelcomeness to go to the trier of fact in this case." Similarly, in Moylan v.
Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986), the Eighth Circuit noted that "[w]hether the
activities complained of were unwelcome is usually disputed, as in the present case" and empha-
sized that the question of "[w]hether the conduct is unwelcome is a fact question." Id.
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this determination is not easy to make.96 Like many factual inquiries in
which the parties' accounts of the relevant occurrences are likely to disa-
gree, plaintiffs alleging sexual harassment often describe the facts quite dif-
ferently than do the alleged harassers. For example, the Fourth Circuit
pointed out in one case that "[t]he facts in this case are much in dispute. In
fact, they are wildly at variance."97 An example of this "wild variance" in
the parties' different versions of the facts appeared in Vinson, in which the
bank employee denied that he ever touched Vinson in a sexual manner,
after she claimed they had had sexual relations at least forty or fifty times.98
Several of the post-Vinson cases focused on the plaintiffs conduct in
the workplace when determining unwelcomeness. In some cases, courts
found that the plaintiffs conduct quite obviously communicated the un-
welcomeness of the sexual advance. These included such extreme conduct
by the plaintiff as the following: the plaintiff showed her pursuer a notice
of sexual harassment charges she had filed against another employee;99 the
plaintiff threw coffee on her pursuer, screamed, and ran away;"° the plain-
tiff hit her taunter, cursed him, and left in tears.' In a First Circuit case,102
the plaintiff reacted in a less dramatic manner, simply ignoring sexual com-
ments, quickly changing the subject, or silently withdrawing her hands from
her supervisor's grasp. Although the plaintiffs response was mild rather
than aggressive and pointed, the court found that the "evidence that the
96. The Vinson court stated that "the question whether the particular conduct was indeed
unwelcome presents difficult problems of proof and turns largely on credibility determinations
committed to the trier of fact." Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
97. See Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 554 (4th Cir. 1987). In this case, the plaintiff
alleged numerous incidents of harassment by a USAir pilot, including his reaching under her skirt
and grabbing her genitals, making numerous obscene comments, and dropping his trousers. The
pilot denied most of these allegations and an eyewitness claimed that the pants-dropping incident
was merely an attempt by the pilot to tuck in his shirt. Id at 555.
In Paroline v. Unisys, 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1979), vacated in part on reh'g, 900 F.2d 27
(4th Cir. 1990), the Fourth Circuit judge began his description of the case by stating that "[niot
surprisingly, the parties present different versions of the events that prompted Paroline's lawsuit."
Id. at 102. In Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nor. Jordan v.
Hodel, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989), the Ninth Circuit stated unabashedly that the district court had dealt
with the parties' varying versions of the events by "split[ting] the difference" and finding that the
parties "'were more probably than not engaged in flirtatious conversation and conduct which
could, and probably did, leave each of them with the impression that he or she had been the
recipient of a sexual advance."' Id. at 1375.
98. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 60-61.
99. Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 573 (2d Cir. 1989). In this case,
the court found that the facts "clearly demonstrate that [the pursuer's] conduct was unsolicited
and unwelcome .... " Id. at 578.
100. Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1989).
101. Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir. 1990).
102. Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 780 (lst Cir. 1990).
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employee consistently demonstrated her unalterable resistance to all sexual
advances is enough to establish unwelcomeness."' 10 3
In other cases, however, courts found the target's response to be am-
biguous and thus not adequate to prove her assertion that the sexual conduct
was unwelcome. For example, in Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc.,"°
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit would not recognize the plain-
tiff's mild reaction to her superior's sexual advances as a clear communica-
tion of unwelcomeness. The court noted that, when the superior made
sexual overtures to the plaintiff, "[a]lthough the Plaintiff rejected these ef-
forts, her initial rejections 'ere neither unpleasant nor unambiguous, and
gave [the superior] no reason to believe that his moves were unwel-
come." 105 The court went on to point out that, "[a]fter one misguided act,
in which [the superior] briefly fondled Plaintiff's breast and was repri-
manded by her for doing so, he accepted his defeat and terminated all such
conduct."' 06 The court in this case seemed to require nothing less than a
clear and adamant "no" on the plaintiff's part before believing that her com-
munication of unwelcomeness was unambiguous.
Some post-Vinson decisions exhibit courts' reluctance to find un-
welcomeness if the target initially participated in the workplace interactions
that she later tried to characterize as harassment. For example, in Reed v.
Shepard,1"7 the Seventh.Circuit Court of Appeals found the plaintiff's "en-
thusiastic receptiveness to sexually suggestive jokes and activities" fatal to
her claim of unwelcomeness.10 8 The court did not accept the plaintiff's
explanation that, as a new young police officer, she felt that taking part in
the conduct was the only way she could be accepted."m
In Swentek v. USAir, Inc., " 0 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit focused on the plaintiff's workplace conduct but characterized the un-
103. Id. at 784 (citing Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (lst Cir. 1988)).
104. 913 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1990).
105. Id. at 459 (quoting Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 532, 533 (N.D.
Ill. 1988)).
106. I. at 459 (quoting Dockter, 684 F. Supp. at 533). According to the testimony of the
plaintiff, the boss had taken the plaintiff to a restaurant on the premise that they would be meeting
clients (who never showed up) and had tried to kiss her there and had been rejected. She asked
him to take her home. At her apartment door, he again attempted to kiss her and this time fondled
her breast. L at 460.
107. 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
108. Id. at 491.
109. Id. at 492. In Wyerick v. Bayou Steel Corp., 887 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1989), a woman
who had been subjected to numerous sexual comments responded three times in a similar vein.
Id. at 1273. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, stating that these
responses precluded the plaintiff from claiming that the comments were unwelcome. Id. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that there remained a genuine issue of fact
as to whether the unwelcomeness showing had been made. Id. at 1275.
110. 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987).
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welcomeness question as one bearing directly on the plaintiff's interactions
with the alleged harasser, as opposed to the plaintiff's past actions in the
business setting. In this case, the plaintiff had told the harasser to leave her
alone."' Nonetheless, the trial court found that, because the plaintiff was
known to use foul language and make sexual remarks, she was the type of
person who generally welcomed such comments. 1 2 The court of appeals
reversed, holding that the plaintiff's past conduct failed to preclude a find-
ing of unwelcomeness, particularly in light of the plaintiff having specifi-
cally told the harasser that his conduct was not welcome to her."
3
In an even more pointed decision, Burns v. McGregor Electronics In-
dustries, Inc.," 4 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit refused to al-
low the plaintiff's non-work activity of posing nude for magazine
photographs to negate her claim that her fellow employees' conduct toward
her was unwelcome. In this case, the plaintiff was subject to taunting com-
ments by her co-workers both before and after they discovered that she had
posed nude for photographs which were published in a biker magazine.
The district court found that, although the plaintiff did not solicit or invite
the harassing comments, they would not be "offensive" to her because she
had posed for the magazine photographs." 5 The district court stated that
the element of "unwelcomeness" requires a showing of both unwelcome-
ness and offensiveness." 6 The district court justified its judgment for the
defendant by stating that the plaintiffs outside conduct indicated that she
would not have been offended if someone to whom she was attracted had
spoken to her of the pictures." 7 The court of appeals stated that for the
district court "to find that the conduct was unwelcome but not offensive
was internally inconsistent as a matter of law.""'  The court of appeals also
rejected the district court's justification as "unsupported in law" and went
on to note that "this rationale would allow a complete stranger to pursue
sexual behavior at work that a female worker would accept from her hus-
band or boyfriend. The standard would allow a male employee to kiss or
fondle a female worker at the workplace." " '9 The court did indicate, how-
111. lId at 557.
112. kd
113. Id
114. 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993). The Eighth Circuit had examined the same case the previ-
ous year, had reversed the district court's finding for the defendant, and had remanded the case for
further consideration. Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 955 F.2d 559, 566 (8th Cir. 1992). The
district court reaffirmed its earlier findings. Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 807 F. Supp. 506,
510 (N.D. Iowa 1992).
115. Burns, 807 F. Supp. at 509.
116. lId at 508.
117. Id
118. Burns, 989 F.2d at 962.
119. l at 963.
1994]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
ever, that the nude photographs could be considered as evidence when ex-
amining the totality of events that had ensued. The court went on to point
out that, in this case, they were not dealing with a woman who had told
sexual stories, engaged in sexual gestures, initiated sexual talk, or solicited
sexual encounters from co-workers. 120
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Lipsett v. University of
Puerto Rico,' 2 1 added a new dimension to the factual inquiry of un-
welcomeness by pointing out that the Supreme Court in Vinson had failed
to determine from whose perspective the issue of unwelcomeness would be
determined. The Lipsett court noted that perspective is "particularly impor-
tant because often a determination of sexual harassment turns on whether it
is found that the plaintiff misconstrued or overreacted to what the defendant
claims were innocent or invited overtures."' 122 The court concluded that the
factfinder must keep both the target's and the alleged harasser's perspec-
tives in mind when determining whether the conduct was welcome.'
23
As noted above,2  the EEOC Guidance indicates that the finding of
unwelcomeness will be strengthened by evidence of a contemporaneous
complaint by the target of the harassment. The courts of appeals, however,
have not relied on the existence of a complaint in their determinations of
whether the trial court properly found conduct to be welcome or unwel-
come. Instead, the existence of a complaint is most often important in de-
120. IL at 963. The court of appeals did not think it necessary to remand the case for another
"factual" finding on the unwelcomeness issue, but rather held that, because the district court had
specifically found the conduct to be uninvited and had found that the conduct was objectively so
severe and pervasive as to alter the working conditions of "a hypothetical reasonable woman,"
actionable sexual harassment had indeed occurred. Il at 964. The court of appeals did remand
the case to the district court with directions to compute the plaintiff's economic damages and enter
a judgement in her favor. Il at 962.
121. 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
122. Id. at 898.
123. Id. at 898. The court also felt that men and women must share the responsibility for
eradicating sexual harassment. As the court stated:
The man must be sensitive to signals from the woman that his comments are unwel-
come, and the woman, conversely, must take responsibility for making those signals
clear. In some instances, a woman may have the responsibility for telling the man di-
rectly that his comments or conduct is unwelcome. In other instances, however, a wo-
man's consistent failure to respond to suggestive comments or gestures may be
sufficient to communicate that the man's conduct is unwelcome.
Id The issue of perspective has received much more attention in those cases that debate whether
to apply the standard of a "reasonable person!' or a "reasonable woman" in determining whether
the conduct was so severe and pervasive as to alter the conditions of one's employment. See, e.g.,
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611,
620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
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termining whether the employer received actual notice of the harassment. 1"
Even so, the fact that a target did not complain formally casts doubt in some
cases on the credibility of her testimony.'26 In Chamberlin v. 101 Realty,
Inc.,' 27 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit indicated that the plain-
tiff's burden of proving the unwelcomeness issue would be helped by evi-
dence of "more emphatic means of communicating the unwelcomeness of
the supervisor's sexual advances, as by registering a complaint" but recog-
nized that such action "may prompt the termination of her employment,
especially when the sexual overtures are made by the owner of the firm."' 2
This unfortunate possibility was realized in Lipsett v. University of Puerto
Rico, 12 9 in which complaints by two female residents to the supervising
physicians resulted in their being put on probation and one even being ad-
vised to seek the help of a psychiatrist.'
30
The interaction of the EEOC Guidelines and Policy Guidance, the
Supreme Court's decision in Vinson, and the post-Vinson cases from the
circuit courts of appeals provide us with a relatively clear picture of the
parameters of the welcomeness inquiry. First of all, despite some contrary
language in Vinson, the burden is clearly one of requiring the plaintiff to
prove that the sexual conduct or advance was unwelcome. All circuits ex-
cept one follow this approach. The generally accepted definition of "unwel-
come" conduct is conduct that the plaintiff did not solicit, invite, or incite
and that was offensive or undesirable to the plaintiff. The question of
whether the conduct was unwelcome is a question of fact. Although one
circuit court stated that the issue of unwelcomeness must be examined from
both the plaintiff's and the alleged harasser's perspectives, the evidence
most successful in showing unwelcomeness is evidence of affirmative, re-
peated, and sometimes even physical rebuffs by the plaintiff of the alleged
harasser's advances. One circuit court indicated that mild, pleasant re-
sponses that may be construed by the alleged harasser as ambiguous dictate
against a finding that the conduct was unwelcome. Courts are likely to
admit evidence that may negate the claim of unwelcomeness such as evi-
dence of the plaintiff's speech or conduct or activities both in and outside
the workplace, although some circuits have attempted to limit the inquiry to
125. See, e.g., Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 478 (5th Cir. 1989); Hicks
v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1417-18 (10th Cir. 1987); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d
630, 633 (6th Cir. 1987).
126. See, e.g., Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 1990);
Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1375 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Jordan v. Hodel, 488
U.S. 1006 (1989).
127. 915 F.2d 777 (1st Cir. 1990).
128. Id. at 784.
129. 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
130. Id. at 907.
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a plaintiff's conduct within the workplace. Evidence that the plaintiff en-
thusiastically participated in the workplace sexual activity is likely to dis-
count the plaintiff's claim that the conduct was not welcome. Finally, the
filing of a contemporaneous complaint by the plaintiff is compelling evi-
dence of unwelcomeness. Conversely, the failure to file a complaint, while
not completely fatal to the plaintiff's claim, may raise suspicion as to
whether the conduct was unwelcome.
I. SOCIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FINDINGS ON
SFXUAL HARASSMENT
Before examining the viability of shifting the burden of proving wel-
comeness and narrowing its definition, some attention should be given to
findings outside the traditional arena of legal theory. The number of socio-
logical and psychological studies on sexual harassment issues has risen dra-
matically during the past five years. The studies discussed in this section
are among those with findings that bear directly or indirectly on the issue of
welcomeness.
A. The Scope of the Sexual Harassment Problem
Recent studies make it difficult, if not impossible, to dispute one thing
about sexual harassment-it is a widespread, costly problem in the Ameri-
can workplace. In 1980, the federal government undertook what remains to
date the most extensive study of sexual harassment in the workplace. The
United States Merit Systems Protection Board published the findings of this
study in 1981.131 The Board updated the study ("Merit Systems Protection
Board Study") in 1987 and issued an amended Report in 1988.132 The orig-
inal study gained much attention due to its "conservative" estimate that sex-
ual harassment cost the federal government nearly $189 million in turnover
and lost productivity between May 1978 and May 1980.133 The updated
study estimated the cost to the federal government between May 1985 and
May 1987 as $267 million, "in addition to the personal cost and anguish
many of the victims had to bear."
134
The Merit Systems Protection Board Study assimilated the answers
given by approximately 19,500 civilian employees of the Executive Branch
131. MEm SYSTEMs PROTECTION BOARD STUDY, supra note 3.
132. U.S. MErT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOV-
ERNmENT: AN UPDATE (1988) [hereinafter UPDATED MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
STUDY].
133. MERrT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD STUDY, supra note 3, at 99.
134. UPDATED MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD STUDY, supra note 132, at 4. Other stud-
ies have shown that "[s]exual harassment is costing the nation millions of dollars a year in law
suits and reduced productivity." NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH ON VoMEN, SEXUAL HAR.
AssMENr: RESEARCH AND RESOURCES 10 (1992) [hereinafter RESEARCH AND RESOURCES].
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of the federal government.'35 The Study characterized the incidence of sex-
ual harassment in the federal workforce as "widespread-forty-two percent
of all female employees and fifteen percent of all male employees reported
being sexually harassed."'136 Other studies have consistently reported that
at least fifty percent of working women have experienced or will experience
sexual harassment at some point during their working lives. 137 The studies
indicate that more women than men are the targets of sexual harassment,
but that men are not immune from this workplace problem.'
13
B. Differences in the Perception of Sexual Harassment
Most of the current studies indicate the existence of significant gender
differences in the perception of sexual harassment. Women tend to inter-
pret a broader range of behaviors as constituting sexual harassment than do
men.139 At least one researcher postulates that, consequently, "men may
file fewer sexual harassment complaints than women, even if they have
identical experiences at work" and, hence, "men may be more likely than
women to initiate sexual behaviors at work that lead to complaints of har-
assment, since they are less likely to view such behaviors as
unacceptable."' 4 o
Even more importantly within the context of the welcomeness issue, a
1989 study found a "tendency among men to see promiscuous, seductive,
and generally 'sexy' behavior-where women see or intend to project only
135. The original questionnaire was mailed out to 23,000 male and female civilian employees;
the response rate was about 85%. The Study noted that this response rate "was considerably
higher than usually expected on mail surveys." MERrr SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD STUDY,
supra note 3, at 2.
136. Id. at 3. The Updated Merit Protection Board Study reported that in 1987, the incidence
of sexual harassment was 42% among federal female workers and 14% among male workers.
UPDATED MEMrr SYSTEMS PROTECnON BOARD STUDY, supra note 132, at 2.
137. See BARBARA GUrEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE: THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
ON MEN, WOMEN AND ORGANmATIONs 44 (1985); WORmKNG WOMEN UNTED INsTrruTE, RE-
SPONSES OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES AGENCIES TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMPLAINTS: A
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1978), cited in RESEARCH & REsouRcEs, supra note 134, at 9;
Claire Safran, Sexual Harassment: The View from the Top, REDBOOK, Mar. 1981, at 46-51;
138. See, e.g., UPDATED MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARDS STUDY, supra note 132, at 2;
Alison M. Konrad & Barbara A. Gutek, Impact of Work Experiences on Attitudes toward Sexual
Harassment, 31 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 422, 435-37 (1986).
139. See, e.g., GUTEK, supra note 137, at 79-94; Eliza G. Collins & Timothy B. Blodgett,
Sexual Harassment: Some See It, Some Won't, 59 HARv. Bus. REv. MarJApr. 1981, at 76 passim;
Donald E. Maypole & Rosemarie Skaine, Sexual Harassment of Blue Collar Workers, 9 J. OF Soc.
& Soc. WELFARE 682, 691-94 (1982). But see Douglas D. Baker et al., Perceptions of Sexual
Harassment: A Re-Examination of Gender Differences, 124 J. PSYCHOL. 409, 410 (1989)
("[T]hese gender differences in perceptions of sexual harassment may be overstated.").
140. Konrad & Gutek, supra note 138, at 422.
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friendly and outgoing behavior."14 This study consisted of three different
scenarios. In the first scenario, 98 previously unacquainted undergraduate
students were told to engage, in male-female pairs, in short "getting ac-
quainted" conversations while 109 other students observed. 142 In the sec-
ond scenario, 75 male and 88 female undergraduates observed a videotape
of a male and female co-worker interacting on a business matter. 143 In the
third scenario, 98 male undergraduates and 102 female undergraduates
viewed a videotape involving an interchange between a male professor and
a female student.'" The participants in all three scenarios then responded
to questionnaires designed to elicit their characterization of the type of be-
havior they had observed. The authors of the study found "clear and con-
sistent" results in all three scenarios showing that "[m]en, especially when
observing women's behaviors, were more likely to perceive sexual motives
or intentions (flirtatiousness, promiscuity, seductiveness, sexiness) than wo-
men.' 145 The authors concluded:
When women at work or school attempt to create a pleasant social
environment by behaving in a warm, friendly, and outgoing man-
ner, their behavior may be (mis)interpreted by their male col-
leagues as a sign of sexual interest or availability .... Some of
the more common forms of sexual harassment, such as repeated
requests for dates, staring or ogling, unnecessary touching, and
sexual innuendos, may result when men act on their
(mis)perceptions of women's behaviors. Recall that men are
more likely to view such behaviors as normal and less likely to
label them sexual harassment.
46
Other studies emphasize that the majority of women generally do not like
("welcome") sexual encounters in the workplace. 47 One researcher reports
that sixty-seven percent of the males who responded to her survey said they
would be "flattered" if they were propositioned by a woman at work, while
only seventeen percent of the women responded that they would consider a
proposition by a male flattering.'
4 1
141. Frank E. Saal et al., Friendly or Sexy? It May Depend on Whom You Ask, 13 PSYCHOL.
WOMEN Q. 263, 265 (1989).
142. Id at 267.
143. Id. at 270.
144. Id. at 272.
145. Id. at 274.
146. Id. at 265-66.
147. GtTEK, supra note 137, at 95-96; Susan Littler-Bishop et al., Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace as a Function of Initiator's Status: The Case of Airline Personnel, 38 J. Soc. IssuEs
137, 147 (1982); Beth E. Schneider, Consciousness About Sexual Harassment Among Heterosex-
ual and Lesbian Women Workers, 38 J. Soc. Issuts 75, 94 (1982).
148. GtrrEK, supra note 137, at 96.
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C. Targets' Responses to Sexual Harassment
Recent psychological and sociological studies have focused increas-
ingly on the formal and informal reactions of targets of sexually harassing
behavior. These studies generally agree that targets are reluctant to lodge
formal complaints against their harassers. 49 One study, indicating that
only five percent of the targets filed a formal complaint, explains that "vic-
tims are just as likely to change jobs as a result of sexual harassment as they
were to take formal action."' 50 Researchers propose a variety of possible
reasons for this reluctance, including a fear of reprisal and blame, concerns
about loss of privacy, or the belief that nothing would be done in response
to the complaint.'' One researcher notes a fourth reason for women's hesi-
tancy to file a complaint: concern for the harasser. This researcher ex-
plains: "Women are aware of the gravity of making a formal, public
complaint; women won't do that lightly. If there is a reasonable excuse for
a man's behavior, women are very forgiving."' 52 In addition, as typically
occurs when a superior harasses a subordinate, the livelihood of the target
depends upon the harasser, thus causing the target not only to refrain from
filing a formal complaint, but also to seek to maintain a friendly rapport
with the harasser.'53 One study indicates that the most common reaction of
both men and women targets of sexual harassment is what is termed the
"passive" response of ignoring the behavior or ignoring the harasser.'54
According to this study, other commonly invoked behaviors include telling
the harasser to stop the behavior and making a joke of the behavior.' 55 A
few respondents also indicated that their response was to go along with the
harassing behavior.'
56
149. ld. at 71-73; MEirr SYSTEMs PROTECTION BoARD SruDy, supra note 3, at 71 (stating that
only 3% of women and 2% of men filed formal complaints); UPDATED MERIT SYSTEMs PROTEC-
TioN BoARD STUDy, supra note 132, at 27 (reporting that 5% of men and women took formal
action when harassed); see also Jan Salisbury et al., Counseling Victims of Sexual Harassment, 23
PSYCHOTHERAPY 316, 319-20 (1986) (describing the negative physical and mental symptoms of
women who took formal action compared to those who did not).
150. UPDATED MEnrr SYsTEM PROTECTiON BoARD STUDy, supra note 132, at 27.
151. GUTEK, supra note 137, at 71-73; UPDATED MaErr SYsTEMs PRoTECTION BoARD STUDY,
supra note 132, at 27.
152. RESEARCH Am REsouRcEs, supra note 134, at 12 (quoting conversation with Barbara
Gutek).
153. See id at 12-13.
154. UPDATED MERrr SYSTEMS PROTECTION BoARD STuDY, supra note 132, at 24. The Study
reported that 52% of women targets and 42% of male targets ignored the behavior or did nothing,
while 43% of women targets and 31% of male targets avoided the harasser. Id.
155. Id. The Study showed that 44% of women targets and 25% of men targets told the
harasser to stop the behavior, while 20% of both men and women targets reported that they had
made a joke of the behavior. Id.
156. Il The study indicated that 4% of women and 7% of men went along with the behavior.
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In short, sociological and psychological studies are virtually unani-
mous in their finding that sexual harassment is widespread in the American
workplace. Although women are the more likely victims of sexual harass-
ment, men too are reporting its occurrence. When asked whether sexual
conduct in the workplace is generally "welcomed" by them, most women
responded that it is not.
A majority of the studies indicate that there are gender differences in
the perception of what behavior qualifies as "harassment," which may lead
to differing determinations as to whether behavior would be welcomed by
the target. Studies show that both male and female targets do not tend to
react to harassment by filing a formal complaint. The most common reac-
tions take the form of avoidance behavior or passive toleration. Research-
ers posit that targets are reluctant to report the harassment because they fear
retaliation, further denigration, blame, and loss of privacy. Researchers also
point out that targets hesitate to report harassment because of their own risk
of loss of privacy and, finally, because they do not want to hurt the harasser
unless it is absolutely necessary.
It1. A PROPOSED PARADIGM FOR PROVING WELDOMENESS
A comparison of recent court decisions and EEOC pronouncements
with the findings of recent sociological and psychological studies reveals
some troubling discrepancies. For example, although studies indicate that
women view sexual conduct in the workplace as generally "unwelcome,"
the law presumes that it is welcome and requires the target to prove other-
wise. Additionally, although some lip service is given by the courts to ex-
amining whether the conduct was unwelcome from the perspective of both
the target and the harasser, more aggressive and even physical rebuffs (in
other words, behavior that is more typical of men than women) are gener-
ally the only behaviors that are unquestioned as evidence of unwelcome-
ness. Milder and more passive behaviors (those typically associated with
women) are likely to be viewed by courts as "ambiguous" and thus not
always positive evidence on the issue of unwelcomeness. The EEOC Gui-
dance relies strongly on whether the target filed a formal complaint after the
harassment, despite studies which indicate that most targets do not respond
in this way and despite theories that the target's risks (or, at least, the tar-
get's perceptions of risks) when filing a complaint outweigh any perceived
advantages. Finally, some recent cases indicate that a sexual harassment
trial is likely to focus on the target's conduct, both in and outside the work-
place, rather than on the conduct of the alleged harasser. 157
157. See supra text accompanying notes 107-20.
524 [Vol. 72
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The gap between the legal approach to the welcomeness issue and the
"reality" reflected in current sociological and psychological studies cannot
be ignored. The current paradigm for proving unwelcomeness unfairly bur-
dens the targets of sexual harassment in ways that may confirm the sound-
ness of the decision of many targets never to file a complaint at all. The
gap can be narrowed by a simple manipulation of the paradigm, a manipula-
tion that not only is more consistent with general Title VII models of
proof 5 ' but also brings sexual harassment cases in line with their counter-
parts in racial and national origin harassment.
The suggested paradigm is one which presumes that sexual conduct is
unwelcome unless proved welcome. The paradigm also would limit the
proof of welcomeness so that only objective evidence of an invitation or
consent given directly to the alleged harasser would suffice. In other words,
the proposed paradigm would do two things. First, it would shift the wel-
comeness inquiry to the status of an "affirmative defense" by the alleged
harasser rather than its current status as an element of the plaintiff's prima
facie case. Second, it would refine the definition of "welcomeness," thus
narrowing the scope of the inquiry to one that allows the admission only of
evidence which makes a positive showing that the target affirmatively solic-
ited, invited, or consented to the conduct and that bears directly on interac-
tions between the alleged harasser and the target. Designed to reflect
sociologically and psychologically verified actualities about sexual harass-
ment, the proposed paradigm should clarify the boundaries within which
those who choose to engage in sexual conduct within the workplace may
operate, Hence, without eliminating sexual interaction from the workplace,
the proposed paradigm should limit its scope to those who choose freely
and affirmatively to take part in it.
A. Shifting the Burden of Proving Welcomeness
Under the suggested paradigm for examining sexual harassment cases,
welcomeness would be characterized as an affirmative defense rather than
as an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case.159 Once the plaintiff has
proved the sexual bargain (in a quid pro quo case160 ), or that the actions of
the harasser were so severe and pervasive as to alter the terms and condi-
158. See infra text accompanying notes 181-87.
159. This approach has also been suggested by several commentators. See Ann C. Juliano,
Did She Ask for It?: The "Unwelcome" Requirement in Sexual Harassment Cases, 77 CoRNEL
L. Ray. 1558, 1574-75 (1992); Anne C. Levy, Sexual Harassment Cases in the 1990s: "Backlash-
ing" the "Backlash" Through Title VII, 56 ALB. L. RFav. 1, 33-35 (1992); Vhay, supra note 35, at
345-46.
160. For a definition of quid pro quo harassment, see supra note 7.
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tions of her employment (in a hostile environment casel 61), the harasser will
be found to have committed actionable sexual harassment 162 unless the har-
asser can prove that the conduct was welcomed.
For several reasons, shifting the burden of proving 63 welcomeness to
the person who perpetrated the sexual conduct puts that burden where it
rightly belongs. First, the burden-shifting overturns the presumption that
most workers welcome sexual conduct and instead presumes that most
workers do not.' The latter presumption coincides not only with the find-
ings of current psychological and sociological research165 but also with
common sense. One need not be trained in law or psychology to under-
stand that most people (male or female) do not "welcome" conduct that is
humiliating, severely distracting, and potentially harmful to their ability to
perform successfully at their jobs. 66 The law of racial and ethnic harass-
ment recognizes this conclusion. 67 In these cases, courts focus on the se-
verity and pervasiveness of the harasser's conduct because the conduct
itself is presumptively unwelcome. 68  As noted above, the psychological
and sociological studies support the same presumption for sexual conduct in
the workplace.
169
The burden-shifting justifiably requires the proof of a positive action,
an action that may be verified in advance by objective evidence. The cur-
rent paradigm requires the far more difficult proof of a negative-in simple
terms, a proof similar to your mother trying to prove that she did not "wel-
come" your brother's date, a guest whom she admitted and tolerated. Some
courts find that the plaintiff s passive silence, either during or after the sex-
161. There are a number of interesting articles that deal with the standard to be used in making
this showing. See, e.g., supra note 7 and articles cited therein. The standard is not the subject of
this Article and thus will not be discussed herein.
162. The issue of employer liability for the harasser's actions will not be discussed in this
Article. For discussion of this issue, see Sperry, supra note 10.
163. It should be emphasized that the burden suggested here is not merely one of "articulat-
ing" that the conduct was welcomed, but actually one of proving the welcomeness. In Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the Supreme Court provided that, in
a Title VII case, after the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defend-
ant, but it is only the relatively easy burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the conduct in question. Id. at 253 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973)).
164. It should be kept in mind that the burden still remains on the plaintiffs to show that the
actions had a negative effect on their Working conditions.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 131-56 (describing psychological and sociological
studies).
166. In the words of Professor Levy, "It is difficult to imagine, after a full understanding of
both covert and overt harassment, that any person could welcome being debased, debilitated, or
stereotyped in a negative manner." Levy, supra note 159, at 34.
167. See infra text accompanying note 187.
168. d
169. For cases addressing this issue, see supra notes 107-20.
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ual activity, discredits the target's allegation that the harasser's conduct was
not welcome. 170 The courts' approach of placing the burden of proving
unwelcomeness on the target arguably creates an unfounded but necessary
new element to the plaintiff's case: those seeking to win sexual harassment
actions must show that they either confronted the harasser or complained
about the conduct soon after it occurred. Consequently, an informed target
would now know that her chances of success in a sexual harassment suit are
directly dependent upon whether she either confronts her harasser directly
or subsequently files a complaint.171 In fact, a target who had just read the
most recent releases from the circuit courts of appeals would realize that her
best chances for success lay in her physically repelling her pursuer in some
manner, such as hitting him or slapping him in the face!172 This additional
burden of confrontation or complaint is in complete conflict with studies
which indicate that most male and female targets neither confront their ha-
rassers nor file a subsequent complaint.173 This burden not only harshly
ignores the real fears of many targets that either action could result in retali-
ation or discharge,' 74 it ignores the fact that most targets of sexual harass-
ment are women to whom the concept of physically striking another
individual is quite likely to be alien.' 75
It has been said, in the context of a sexual harassment case,1 76 that
Title VII was not "designed to bring about a magical transformation in the
social mores of American workers."'177 Yet it would be naive to assume
that sexual harassment will be curbed if there is not some change in the
conduct of American workers, if not in their "mores." The current case law
and EEOC Guidance, when viewed in light of findings about targets' reac-
tions to sexual harassment, suggest that the change be made by the targets
rather than by those who engage in sexual conduct by allowing harassers to
proceed under the presumption that their actions are normal and welcome
170. See, e.g., Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1990), discussed
supra notes 104-06.
171. Having found that the plaintiff's rebuffs of her boss's attentions were "neither unpleasant
nor unambiguous," in Dockter, the Seventh Circuit noted also that the plaintiff had not com-
plained of her boss's actions to anyone at the management level. 913 F.2d at 459-60. One study
indicates that a complainant's chances of success in a sexual harassment lawsuit are dependent
upon three factors: (1) whether the behavior involved sexual assault, unwanted physical contact,
or threatening sexual propositions; (2) whether there were witnesses; (3) and whether a complaint
was filed with management. See David E. Terpstra & Douglas D. Baker, Outcomes of Sexual
Harassment Charges, 31 AcAD. oF MGmrT. 1 185, 192-93 (1988).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 99-106.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 149-56.
174. Id.
175. ld.
176. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984), affid, 805 F.2d 611
(6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
177. lId at 430.
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until told otherwise. These same cases and Guidance would put the burden
of a change in conduct on the targets by forcing them either to confront the
harasser or complain formally, both actions in which they have heretofore
been fearful or otherwise reluctant to engage.
1 7 8
In general terms, logic and social policy dictate that if existing
problems cannot be alleviated without someone changing his or her behav-
ior, the person causing the problem should be the one who is forced to
change.1 7 9 Shifting the burden of proof would do just that. In particular, if
a potential harasser is alerted to the possibility that he or she will have to
defend conduct as solicited or invited or consented to by the target, that
person is far more likely to take seriously a target's responses. In other
words, a polite "no" will suffice to ward off the informed harasser and si-
lence will not be so quickly perceived as "welcoming." Even in cases in
which the target's responses may be characterized as ambiguous, 180 the in-
formed harasser will know that he or she bears the burden of proving that
the target's responses were clearly affirmative and inviting.
Third, the shifting of the burden of proof will bring the sexual harass-
ment model of proof in line with other Title VII models."8' In McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green,"8 2 the Supreme Court set out the model of proof
for Title VII cases. The prima facie case laid out in McDonnell Douglas, a
simple four-pronged test,8 3 contains no requirement of showing motive or
intent. Plaintiffs must prove that they are members of one of the five "pro-
tected" classes listed in Title VII (race, sex, national origin, color, reli-
178. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit takes a somewhat milder approach to this
issue, requiring both parties to make changes in their behavior and responses: "The man must be
sensitive to signals from the women that his comments are unwelcome, and the woman, con-
versely, must take responsibility for making those signals clear." Lipsett v. University of Puerto
Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (lst Cir. 1988). But query whether it is the target or the harasser who is
truly being asked to change behavior by this court.
179. For example, several years ago, statistics showing a growing number of deaths caused by
"drunk drivers" received national attention. A nationwide campaign, taking the forms of educa-
tion, advertising, and stricter legal ramifications, focused on changing attitudes toward the wisdom
of driving a car while inebriated. See John R. Ashmead, Note, Putting a Cork on Social Host
Liability: D'Amico v. Christie, 55 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 995,995 (1989); Mary H. Seminara, Note,
When the Party's Over: McGuiggan v. New England Telphone & Telegraph Co. and the Emer-
gence of a Social Host Liability Standard in Massachusetts, 68 B.U. L. REv. 193, 193 (1988). In
other words, the solution of the problem centered around changing the behavior of those causing
the problem (that is, the drunk drivers themselves and the people who did not stop them from
getting behind the wheel of a car).
180. Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 1990).
181. The validity of the welcomeness requirement as a component of sexual harassment cases
has also been questioned on the grounds that it has no basis in either Title VII or case law prece-
dent. See Juliano, supra note 159, at 1574-75; Vhay, supra note 35, at 344.
182. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
183. Id. at 802.
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gion),1 4 that they are basically qualified for the jobs in question, that they
applied for the jobs and were rejected, and that the jobs remained open.1
85
As one commentator has noted, the plaintiffs are not required at this point
to rebut potential defenses of the defendant even before they are raised.' 6
Also, shifting the burden of proof would bring sexual harassment cases
more in line with racial and national origin harassment cases, in which the
unwelcomeness showing is generally not necessary.'
8 7
184. Civil Rights Act of 1991, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991).
185. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04.
186. Vhay, supra note 35, at 344. In Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248 (1981), the Court clarified that once the prima facie case has been made, the burden shifts to
the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Id. at 253. Pro-
fessor Vhay likens the welcomeness requirement to this later stage in the framework, finding it
"most analogous to a justification for the defendants's act." Vhay, supra note 35, at 344. The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides a somewhat analogous model to the suggested paradigm with
the model for proving "mixed motive" cases. Mixed motive cases are cases in which the plaintiff
has proved a discriminatory motive for an employment action and the defendant has proved a
nondiscriminatory motive for the same action. In these cases, the plaintiff need only show that a
prohibited factor such as race or sex "was a motivating factor for any employment practice" in
order to prove a Title VII violation. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1991).
The defendant may then mitigate damages by showing that it would have made the "same deci-
sion" even if the discriminatory factor had not been considered.
187. See Vhay, supra note 35, at 344. In its amicus curiae brief in the Vinson case, the EEOC
noted as follows:
Whereas racial slurs are intrinsically offensive and presumptively unwelcome, sexual
advances and innuendos are ambiguous: depending on their context, they may be in-
tended by the initiator, and perceived by the recipient, as denigrating or complimentary,
as threatening or welcome, as malevolent or innocuous.
EEOC Brief, supra note 55, at E-5. Arguing against the theory that the welcomeness requirement
is necessary in sexual harassment cases because they, by their very nature, involve ambiguous
circumstances, Professor Vhay says that the "unwelcomeness test is at root the product of an
outdated stereotype" about women using legal action to abuse lovers who have spurned them.
Vhay, supra note 35, at 344.
In fact, most of the racial and national origin harassment cases have focused on whether the
taunts were so severe and pervasive as to constitute harassment, rather than on whether they were
welcome. See, e.g., Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prod. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250, 1254-56 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986) (collecting cases); see also, Daniels v. Essex Group,
Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1274 (7th Cir. 1991) (examining the effect of a mention of the Ku Klux Klan
on a black worker and noting that "[p]lainly, any black would find this graffiti threatening");
Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 348 n.1 (6th Cir. 1988) (justifying a different treat-
ment of racial harassment as opposed to sexual harassment by pointing to the different level of
constitutional scrutiny that is applied in race discrimination as opposed to sex discrimination
cases), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989).
In October 1993, the EEOC issued proposed Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race,
Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin, Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51266 (1993) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609) (proposed Oct. 1, 1993). These Guidelines were designed to deal
with all types of harassment except sexual harassment. Id. at 51266-67. The EEOC noted that
"[slexual harassment continues to be addressed in separate guidelines because it raises issues
about human interaction that are to some extent unique in comparison to other harassment and,
thus, may warrant separate emphasis." Id. at 51267. The proposed Guidelines contain no discus-
sion of the welcomeness concept. The term "unwelcome" does not appear in the definition of
harassment on the basis of race, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability. Id, at 51268.
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Finally, shifting the burden of proof, as opposed to the complete elimi-
nation of the welcomeness element, will protect those few workers who
truly may be the objects of the abusive use of sexuality by an alleged target.
A person who clearly invites a sex-for-benefits bargain or who instigates or
solicits other types of sexual conduct will not be protected unless 'and until
he or she makes clear to the other participant that the conduct is no longer
welcome.' 88 Similarly, retention of the welcomeness element will allow
those workers who choose to engage in consensual sexual conduct to do
so-albeit with caution. The workplace will not become completely devoid
of sex; however, the workplace will be a place where the privacy and free
choice of others not to be the targets of sexual advances take precedence
over a worker's right to engage in sexual conduct. 18 9
B. Narrowing the Definition of Welcomeness
Shifting the burden of proof alone is not sufficient to address the many
problems raised by the current paradigm for proving sexual harassment
cases. Besides placing the burden on the target to confront or complain, the
current paradigm has other frailties that stem from the broad definition of
welcomeness. The current paradigm requires a target monitor her every
activity (including speech, dress, and even "personal fantasies"'19 ) for fear
that she might unwittingly be sending "welcomeness signals" to her har-
asser. Additionally, the current paradigm allows the fact finders at trial to
invade private sectors of the target's life, interactions that have no relevance
to her interactions with the alleged harasser. Finally, the current paradigm
discourages the target from engaging in visible activity at work with one
person unless she is willing to tolerate that conduct with anyone and every-
one.191 Consequently, the suggested approach to redefining the paradigm
This type of harassment is instead defined as "verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows
hostility or aversion toward an individual because of his/her race, color, religion, gender, national
origin, age, or disability, or that of his/her relatives, friends or associates" and that creates a hostile
environment. Id. at 51629. The proposed guidelines point out that "gender" harassment is harass-
ment that is "non-sexual in nature." lId at 51268 n.1. The proposed guidelines also contain no
discussion as to whether the target filed a timely complaint after the conduct occurred.
188. This position is consistent with the EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 15, at 10-11.
189. Compare Downes v. Federal Aviation Admin., 775 F.2d 288, 293 (noting that "the aim
of the U.S. government as employer should be to free its workplace of offensive sexual remarks
entirely") with Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880, n.13 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that "Title VII's
prohibition on sex discrimination in employment does not require a totally desexualized work
place").
190. Vinson v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 57, 57 (1986) (citing Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146
n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
191. For example, in Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993) the district
court found the alleged harasser's actions were not unwelcome because the plaintiff "would not
have been offended if someone she was attracted to did or said the same thing." Id. at 963.
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must include not only a shifting of the burden of proof but a narrowing of
the definition of "welcomeness."
Under the current paradigm, the term "unwelcome" requires the target
to show: (1) that the conduct was neither "solicited nor invited/incited;"
192
and (2) that the target found the conduct offensive. In other words, using
this definition, courts must determine whether the target solicited the partic-
ular conduct at issue and whether the target would generally welcome such
conduct.
1. The "Neither Solicited Nor Invited" Component: Welcoming the
Particular Conduct
The first component of the current unwelcomeness definition states
that conduct is "welcomed" only when it is solicited or incited or invited by
the target. Were this definition in fact respected by the courts, it might be a
suitable one. Unfortunately, as noted above, 93 some post-Vinson cases and
the EEOC Guidance have turned this component around to require a target
to monitor her every move and choice of clothing, both at work and outside
work, to guard against sending out what could be perceived by a harasser as
an invitation. The Supreme Court in Vinson had noted that a target's dress
and speech were relevant evidence on the welcomeness issue.194  In addi-
tion, some of the more recent court decisions seem to grant credibility to the
claim that conduct was "unwelcome" only if the target's rebuffs were bla-
tant or even physical rather than polite and pleasant. 95 Finally, courts have
focused on whether the plaintiff participated at any time and with anyone in
any of the sexually oriented activities about which she later complained. 196
The current definition of "welcomeness," at least as interpreted by
some courts, perpetuates the old stereotype of a woman saying "no" when
she really means "yes." As these courts view the matter, anything short of a
direct verbal or physical "no" in reality means "yes."'197 Without discussing
the issue of perspective, these courts seem to justify a harasser's interpreta-
tion of timidity or silence or ambiguous statements to mean that his ad-
192. See supra text accompanying notes 85-93.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 107-20.
194. 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 99-106.
196. See, e.g., Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484,491 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasizing the plaintiff's
"enthusiastic receptiveness to sexually suggestive jokes and activities"); Wyerick v. Bayou Steel
Corp., 887 F.2d 1271, 1274-75 (5th Cir. 1989) (reversing the district court's summary judgment
that the plaintiff had "welcomed" the activity because she responded in kind with three sexual
comments).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 99-106.
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vances were not unwelcome. 198 The suggested alteration of the definition
would first reverse this approach so that anything other than "yes" must be
interpreted to mean "no." In other words, a harasser would prove "wel-
comeness" only if he can show by objective evidence that the target affirm-
atively and freely solicited or consented to his advances. 199
The "affirmative" aspect of the proposed definition would require that
the harasser show by objective evidence that the target solicited or con-
sented to his advances. Hence, in most circumstances, the following ac-
tions (or, for some, "non-actions") would not be affirmative evidence of
solicitation or consent: silence; a polite "no;" evasive behavior; laughing,
smiling, or otherwise attempting to make light of the advance; backing
away or withdrawing one's hands but not physically leaving the harasser's
presence; maintaining eye contact; changing the subject; accepting a kiss on
the cheek or a quick hug; the failure to complain. Furthermore, a target's
dress would never in and of itself be sufficient evidence of solicitation or
consent. Finally, if there were any ambiguity about the target's actions,
these ambiguities would be construed against the harasser's claim of
welcomeness.
For purposes of proving welcomeness, the new definition would in-
clude only actions directed to the alleged harasser by the target, as opposed
to her interactions with co-workers or anyone outside the workplace. 00
Therefore, if the target accepts a kiss every morning from one co-worker,
this is not affirmative evidence that she welcomes or solicits a kiss from the
harasser. If the target engages in sexually oriented banter with one
co-worker (while this circumstance is somewhat more troublesome), harass-
ers should not be allowed to take this behavior alone as permission to do the
same, particularly if their attempts are met with any evasive or passive
nonresponsiveness. If the target lives in a commune and shares sexual rela-
tions with twenty other people, such evidence also is irrelevant for purposes
of determining whether she solicits or consents to advances by the harasser.
As noted by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in a pre-Vinson
opinion, "A person's private and consensual sexual activities do not consti-
198. The First Circuit has taken some steps toward remedying this perspective problem, not-
ing that the factfinder must keep "both the man's and the woman's perspective in mind." Lipsett
v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988).
199. See Mary Jo Shaney, Perceptions of Harm: The Consent Defense in Sexual Harassment
Cases, 71 IowA L. Rv. 1109, 1124-35 (1986) (presenting and examining the "affirmatively and
freely" approach).
200. For excellent discussions of the imposition on a plaintiff's privacy brought about by the
current scope of the unwelcomeness inquiry, see Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STANFoRD L.
REv. 813 (1991); Juliano, supra note 159, at 1590-92.
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tute a waiver of his or her legal protections against unwelcome and unsolic-
ited sexual harassment." ''
Under the proposed paradigm, in contrast to the EEOC directive,2' the
lack of a formal complaint would be irrelevant to the question of welcome-
ness. While the presence or absence of a complaint may be probative when
deciding whether an employer had notice of harassing conduct, 203 the nar-
row focus on direct interactions between the target and the harasser would
preclude the lack of a filed complaint from being used to prove
welcomeness.
2. The "Offensiveness" Component: Welcoming Such Conduct
in General
The "offensiveness" component of the current definition of un-
welcomeness overlaps the first component but has been dealt with sepa-
rately by the courts of appeals of two circuits. 2°0 This component focuses
not on the target's interactions with the harasser, but rather on whether the
target's actions, dress, or lifestyle indicate to the factfinder that she is the
kind of person who would generally "welcome" sexual behavior or conduct.
For example, the district court in Burns v. McGregor Electronics Industries,
Inc. was so distracted by the target's non-work activity of posing nude for a
magazine that it refused to find that the unwelcomeness requirement had
been met even after it found that the harasser's particular advances toward
the target were "unwelcome."' °  The court of appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed, pointing out that the plaintiff had not posed in suggestive
ways at work and that "[hIer private life, regardless how reprehensible the
trier of fact might find it to be, did not provide lawful acquiescence to un-
wanted sexual advances at her work place by her employer."206
In Swentek v. USAir, Inc.,207 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit made a similar distinction.2" 8 In that case, the evidence presented at
trial included evidence that the plaintiff "was a foul-mouthed individual
who often talked about sex." 2' The trial court concluded that the plaintiff
had not met the unwelcomeness requirement, even though she had specifi-
cally told her harasser to leave her alone, because "she was the kind of
person who could not be offended by such comments and therefore wel-
201. Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983).
202. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 15.
203. For a discussion of the issue of "notice," see Sperry, supra note 10, at 945-48.
204. See supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
205. 955 F.2d 559, 565 (8th Cir. 1992).
206. Bums, 989 F.2d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 1993).
207. 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987).
208. Id. at 557.
209. Id. at 556.
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corned them generally."21 0 The court of appeals reversed, pointing out that
it was the trial judge's responsibility to "determine whether [the] plaintiff
welcomed the particular conduct in question from the alleged harasser," '211
not whether she was generally the kind of person who would "welcome"
such conduct.
The offensiveness component is not a necessary component of the sug-
gested definition of welcomeness. The newly narrowed definition would
focus the inquiry on the target's interactions with her harasser; her lifestyle
or habits or general mode of speech would be irrelevant to the welcomeness
inquiry.212
C. "By Invitation Only:" Application of the Proposed Paradigm
The application of the proposed paradigm is perhaps best explained by
illustrating its use in a number of typical sexual harassment situations. Ob-
viously, the effect of having uninvited guests show up at a party is much
less harmful than the effect of unwelcome sexual harassment, but the use of
the analogy of your mother's party may be helpful in clarifying how the
proposed paradigm is to be used.
1. Quid Pro Quo Harassment: The Sexual Bargain
As noted above,213 quid pro quo sexual harassment is said to occur
when a superior conditions a tangible job benefit on the receipt of sexual
favors. Under the proposed paradigm, the only circumstances under which
such an offer is defensible is if the target actively and affirmatively solicited
the offer or freely consented to it.214
210. Id. at 557.
211. Id.
212. The degree to which the target found the behavior "offensive" is still relevant in hostile
work environment cases but is encompassed by the requirement that the plaintiff prove the harass-
ment was sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter his or her conditions of employment. See
supra note 7. In Bums v. McGregor Elecs. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993), the court of
appeals noted that the district court had found that the harasser's actions were "sufficiently severe
to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment." Id. at 962. This
finding, coupled with the finding that the plaintiff had rebuffed the advances made by her har-
asser, were together sufficient to establish actionable harassment. Id Any independent finding
that the behavior was not "offensive" to the target was logically inconsistent with these two
findings.
213. See supra note 7.
214. The aspect of "freely given" consent is designed primarily for situations in which the
target is a subordinate from whom sexual conduct is being solicited by a superior. For a discus-
sion of the concept of "freely given" consent, see Shaney, supra note 199, at 1225-28; Juliano,
supra note 159, at 1575. In this circumstance, the Vinson Court made it clear that actions which
may ostensibly appear to be "voluntary" are not necessarily actions that are "welcome." See
supra text accompanying notes 62-64; Shaney, supra note 199, at 1125-28.
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The solicitation or invitation must be shown by objective evidence21"
in order for the alleged harasser to carry the burden of his defense. The
invitation or consent must be freely given, in that it must not be coerced nor
the product of fraud or misrepresentation.21 6 Suppose a guest shows up at
your mother's party with a written invitation in hand. While the guest has
strong evidence that he or she was invited, there is still a possibility that the
invitation was procured by fraud-perhaps stolen from a neighbor's
mailbox. Similarly, your mother's sister may have procured the invitation
from your mother on the promise that she had straightened out and would
appear sober at the party. When she shows up drunk, your mother sees that
the representations were false. Hence, this guest cannot successfully claim
to be "welcome" if she bears the burden of showing not only that she was
invited, but also that the invitation was freely given.
The typical quid pro quo scenario involves the risky approach of the
superior, who wants to use job benefits as a bargaining tool for sexual con-
duct, making the "offer" and hoping that it will be accepted.2 17 An affirma-
tive, freely given, objectively provable consent would carry his burden of
proving welcomeness. On the other hand, if he offers and is rebuffed, he
may still be liable for creating a hostile environment even if he does not
withdraw any job benefits due to the refusal.218 In that case, he has no
affirmative defense for his audacity in making an offer that was not
solicited.
The unsolicited offer by a superior can be likened to the situation in
which some of your mother's invited guests (her classmate, your brother)
brought with them guests who had not received an invitation but who hoped
that they would still be welcomed. In each case, the guest ran the risk that
she would not be welcomed by your mother. (For example, what if the
party was a carefully planned dinner for eight and there were not enough
places or plates for the additional person?) The first "uninvited guest"-
your mother's classmate-may have felt that she knew your mother well
215. By "objective" evidence, this author is referring to evidence of actions or words that
clearly solicit sexual interaction. In other words, superiors who make advances without being
asked to do so or who are relying only on their own subjective impressions of things like "the way
she looked at me" or "the number of times she smiled at me" would not be able to prove that they
were invited to enter into the sexual interaction under the proposed paradigm.
216. See supra note 214.
217. For example, the superior may flirt with a subordinate, make comments about her body
or about how nice it would be to have sex with her. He also makes clear to the subordinate that
she will be favored over her peers (for a raise, promotion, etc.) if she consents to a sexual relation-
ship with him.
218. If the subordinate, described supra note 217, refuses to sleep with the superior, he may
still give her a raise. However, the mere fact that she is not required to sleep with him in order to
get the raise may not mitigate the hostile nature of the working environment he has created for her
by his offers.
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enough to run that risk. Supervisors should be advised, however, that they
should not consider themselves in that position. Even if they have found
their subordinate to be playful and pleasant and even a bit flirtatious, the
consequences of risking an unsolicited sex-for-benefits offer should be
viewed always to outweigh any possible positive outcome.
2. Social Interactions in the Workplace
Far more complex issues arise in the context of social interactions be-
tween co-workers, rather than between superiors and subordinates. When
do these actions rise to the level of sexual harassment? The suggested para-
digm will shed some light on these problems.
In the analogy of your mother's party, recall that your brother brought
with him an uninvited date whom your mother was unhappy to see. Under
the current paradigm, your brother may claim that the date was welcome
because your mother did not actively refuse her entry and politely tolerated
her presence. Under the suggested paradigm, however, your mother's inac-
tion and tolerance would not constitute affirmative evidence that your
mother welcomed this guest.
The analogy of your mother's party can also be used to illustrate the
concept of a limited invitation or limited welcomeness.219 When your
mother invited the guests to her party, she invited them for dinner and cock-
tails. It seems obvious that a guest would not be justified in demanding to
spend the night at your mother's house on the theory that he or she was
invited to the party. The same rule should hold for limited invitation social
contacts among co-workers.
In Ellison v. Brady,220 Kerry Ellison met Sterling Gray during her ini-
tial training as a revenue agent . 21 Gray invited her to lunch one day and
she accepted.z 2 Soon thereafter, when Gray began pestering Ellison and
lingering around her desk, she began to evade him and avoid being alone in
the office with him. When he asked her for drinks or for lunch, she de-
clined.' 3 Gray's attentions became more intense and eventually Ellison
complained to her supervisor.'"
When Ellison accepted Gray's initial request for a lunch date, she was
not in turn inviting him to enter into a social relationship with her. Under
219. In other words, a worker who solicits or invites sexual bantering with a co-worker has not
issued a blanket invitation for all types of sexual activity with him, but rather an invitation that is
limited to sexual bantering.
220. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
221. Id. at 873
222. In fact, Gray even stopped by his house to pick up his son's forgotten lunch and gave
Ellison a tour of his house. Id.
223. Id. at 873-74.
224. Id. at 874.
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the current paradigm that focuses on the conduct of the target, however, it
could be argued that Ellison's initial acceptance of the lunch invitation
would dictate against later claims by her that subsequent social interaction
with Gray was unwelcome. Ellison's subsequent evasive responses and po-
lite refusals of social invitations might not themselves serve as adequate
evidence that she communicated her unwillingness to enter into a relation-
ship with him because courts may not recognize the concept of limited
welcomeness. 225
Under the proposed paradigm, Gray would be required to show that his
social/sexual conduct toward Ellison was welcomed by her. Gray could not
offer an acceptable defense of his continual pestering of Ms. Ellison be-
cause he had not received an invitation from her consenting to these interac-
tions. Hence, Gray could be found liable for actions beyond the time when
Ellison began to avoid him as he would not be able to prove that the contin-
ued conduct was welcomed. He could not use her initial acceptance of a
luncheon invitation as evidence of a blanket invitation to become involved
with her.
226
In Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 7 the court failed to view
Dockter's agreement to have dinner with her boss as a limited invitation.22
Dockter agreed to accompany her boss to dinner for the purpose of meeting
clients, but the clients never arrived." 9 During the dinner, her boss grabbed
her and attempted to kiss her several times, so she asked him to take her
home. 30 At her apartment door, her boss attempted to kiss her again and
this time he also fondled her breast."' The court's description of these
events indicated its belief that Dockter's "initial rejections were neither un-
pleasant nor unambiguous" and it was not until her boss fondled her
breast-referred to by the court as "one misguided act"-and she sharply
reprimanded him that the court found a sign of unwelcomeness. Under the
suggested paradigm, Dockter's boss would have no proof that he ever re-
ceived an invitation to fondle Dockter or attempt to kiss her; her agreement
to have dinner with him and clients would be evidence of nothing more
than that she consented to go to a business dinner. The court's view of
Dockter's conduct is sadly reminiscent of the "she asked for it" theory ap-
225. In Ellison, this was not an issue because Ellison eventually became much more forceful
in her refusals and even asked a male friend to tell Gray that she was not interested in him and he
should leave her alone. Id
226. Of course, the issue of whether the conduct is sufficiently severe and pervasive as to alter
the conditions of Ellison's employment is a separate issue and may dictate against a finding of
liability. See supra notes 7, 10 and articles cited therein.
227. 913 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1990).
228. Id at 458-59.
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plied when a woman who is wearing a short skirt or no bra is raped. As
Professor Susan Estrich points out, it is supremely ironic that "[a] doctor
may be required, by tort law, to secure affirmative and informed assent
before he lays his hands on a woman; but a boss may freely touch any
woman subordinate, until and unless she expresses, through her conduct,
her nonassent." 2  The proposed paradigm seeks to hold both supervisors
and co-workers to a higher standard of conduct.
Another troublesome consequence of social interaction among
co-workers occurs when one co-worker willingly enters into a social or sex-
ual relationship with another but then decides not to continue the relation-
ship. In this situation, the person who wants the relationship to stop should
bear responsibility for communicating that message clearly?3 3 Suppose
that your mother sends out written invitations to the party but then becomes
ill and decides to postpone the event. Clearly, your mother has an obliga-
tion to inform the invitees that the party has been postponed. On the other
hand, an invitee who shows up on the original date (not having received the
notice) has no right to demand entry just because she holds an invitation in
her hand. Under both the current paradigm and the suggested paradigm, a
person who initially engages in the relationship has the duty to notify the
other party affirmatively when she wants the relationship to end. Unlike the
current paradigm, however, under the suggested paradigm, if a court has
equally compelling evidence for and against an effective communication of
notice, the issue must be decided against the person who has the burden of
proving welcomeness-that is, against the alleged harasser.
3. Participation in Sexual Conduct
Perhaps the most difficult "welcomeness" cases are those in which the
target is found to have participated to some degree in sexual bantering, jok-
ing, or other such conduct. Particularly in jobs that are male-dominated,
some women have chosen to join in the horseplay in order to be accepted
by their peers. 4 The proposed paradigm may not resolve all the troubling
issues in these cases, but it will at least offer some guidance for courts
dealing with these issues.
One prominent theme of the proposed definition of welcomeness is
that the factfinder should focus only on direct interactions between the tar-
232. Estrich, supra note 200, at 828.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83 (noting EEOC's discussion of the rule).
234. See, e.g., Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991), in which a female rookie "civil-
ian jailor" gave the following explanation as to why she tolerated and even joined in the office
sexual bantering and sexually oriented practical jokes: "Because it was real important to me to be
accepted. It was important for me to be a police officer and if that was the only way I could be




get and the alleged harasser. As previously noted, non-work activities that
do not involve the harasser, as well as generalized choices such as the tar-
get's attire, are irrelevant to the proposed welcomeness inquiry. In addi-
tion, the target's interactions with other workers would not be relevant. In
other words, an alleged harasser who attempted to kiss a co-worker may not
claim that she welcomed it because she kissed another co-worker-nor may
he claim that she welcomed his sexual banter because she welcomed it with
another co-worker-any more than one of your mother's neighbors can ex-
pect to be welcomed at the party just because the other neighbors were
invited.
The factfinder also should focus on whether a target's participation
was only a limited invitation to the alleged harasser. As noted above, an
invitation to your mother's party is not an invitation to spend the night, nor
is the use of a few four-letter words or sexual remarks an invitation to sex-
ual propositions or outrageous sexual conduct.235
D. Should a Welcomeness Inquiry Play Any Role in Sexual Harassment
Cases?
The suggestion of a new paradigm for the sexual harassment welcome-
ness inquiry must be examined in light of current scholarship which con-
tends that there is no place in sexual harassment cases for a welcomeness
inquiry. In her landmark article, Sex at Work, 36 Professor Susan Estrich
makes a compelling argument for the complete deletion of the welcomeness
inquiry.237 Professor Estrich describes three "serious problems" raised by
the welcomeness requirement."' s She argues first that the welcomeness re-
quirement places no burden on the harasser to refrain from harassing behav-
ior until the target, who is often "less powerful and economically
dependent," expresses unwelcomeness?' 9 Second, she points out that the
emphasis on the target's conduct may result in "a polite 'no"' not being a
sufficient expression of unwelcomeness. 1 0 Third, and, in her words, "most
pernicious of all," is the potential for loss of privacy by the target in a trial
that may have to focus on her dress, her speech, and even her non-work
sexual activities.2"
235. For example, in Wyerick v. Bayou Steel Corp., 887 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1989), the court
found that the plaintiff's three sexual remarks were "limited replies to an onslaught of sexual
remarks and gestures" and thus the district court could not grant summary judgment against her on
the ground that she welcomed the conduct. Id at 1275.
236. Estrich, supra note 200.
237. Id. at 826-34.
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Professor Estrich likens this shifting of focus from the harasser to the
target to the consequences of the consent standard in rape cases.242 She
argues further that the welcomeness requirement is "unnecessary even as a
means to protect what some would consider legitimate, consensual sex in
the workplace." '243 She maintains that the requirement is not necessary in
quid pro quo cases in that it is virtually impossible to believe that a bargain
on the order of, "You sleep with me and I'll get you a promotion" could
ever be considered "welcome."" In hostile environment cases, Professor
Estrich argues that the unwelcomeness showing is fundamentally inconsis-
tent with the other requirements of a claim.245 Pointing out that there is a
requirement in hostile environment cases that the conduct be viewed as of-
fensive from an "objective viewpoint," she finds the welcomeness require-
ment to be:
gratuitous when the environment is not proven objectively to be
hostile, because an unwelcome environment which is not objec-
tively hostile does not give rise to liability in any event. It is
gratuitously punitive if the environment is found objectively hos-
tile, for in that case the employer can nonetheless escape the bur-
den of addressing the issue, by portraying this particular woman
as so base as to be unworthy of respect or decency, and by argu-
ing that she thus welcomed, through her conduct, an environment
which a "reasonable" woman would have perceived as hostile.246
Finally, Professor Estrich notes that in a system which already contains
"serious disincentives" for filing sexual harassment complaints (including
loss of privacy and potential retaliation), any theory that adds another disin-
centive should "be supported by a strong justification."2' 7 In Professor Es-
trich's view, "the unwelcomeness inquiry certainly is not."248
As Professor Estrich persuasively suggests, a strong argument may be
made that the welcomeness inquiry plays no credible role in some sexual
harassment cases. In a blatant quid pro quo case, this author agrees with
Professor Estrich that it is difficult to fathom that having benefits such as
242. Id. at 827.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 831. Professor Estrich also proffers what she terms the "more radical response"
against the welcomeness requirement, which is that "there is no such thing as truly 'welcome' sex
between a male boss and a female employee who needs her job." Id. She points out, however,
that one need not adopt this radical response in order to understand the other reasons why wel-
comeness is an unnecessary component of sexual harassment cases. Id.
245. Id. at 833.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 833-34.
248. Id. at 834. Criticisms of the welcomeness inquiry also appear in Juliano, supra note 159,




promotion or salary conditioned on sexual activity is ever truly welcomed.
The "radical response" that supervisor-subordinate sexual interaction is
never consensual,' 9 however, may oversimplify a quite complicated issue.
More dangerous, even, is the potential that such an approach will stereotype
those women who choose to engage in "sex at work" as perennial victims, a
stereotype that serves to reinforce widespread notions of women (who typi-
cally are the subordinates) as weak and unable to control their own desti-
nies.30 Rather than eliminating the welcomeness inquiry entirely, the
result of empowering people who work to make enforceable choices about
the use of their own bodies could perhaps be better achieved by narrowing
the inquiry and shifting the burden of proving welcomeness to the person
who claims to have perceived it, as the proposed paradigm would suggest.
Another argument against entirely eliminating the welcomeness in-
quiry is that most sexual harassment cases are not clear cases of quid pro
quo, sex-for-benefits bargains. Many cases involve workplaces in which
sex remains a part of the subculture. The goal of sexual harassment law in
general is not to eliminate the sexual undercurrent at work, an undercurrent
that may be beneficial or at least nonoffensive to many individuals of both
genders, but rather to hold those who would force it on others responsible
for their actions. The key to holding these persons responsible is to clarify
the situations in which their sexual activities will be deemed appropriate
and hold them liable for their activities in all other situations. In legal
terms, this goal may be achieved by shifting the burden of proving wel-
comeness to the alleged harasser and narrowing the definition of welcome-
ness to mean only overt, objectively provable, noncoerced solicitation or
consent that is directly given by the target to the alleged harasser.
The shifting of the burden of proof combined with the narrowing of
the definition of welcomeness is admittedly a more moderate approach than
that of eliminating the welcomeness inquiry completely. Those who argue
for the elimination of the welcomeness requirement often argue for the
elimination of sexuality from the workplace." 1 The suggested paradigm is
one that is designed not to eliminate sexuality from the workplace but to
relegate it to its appropriate place. The work of many scholars in the sexual
249. For a discussion of this response, see supra note 244.
250. In addition, an elimination of the welcomeness element might imply the extremist notion
that women never welcome sexual attention or interaction at work and thus must be protected
from all advances made by their colleagues. This implication is based on stereotyped notions
about women and men. This implication also resembles too strongly the type of attitude that
engendered many early state laws designed to "protect' women from the harsh consequences of
entering the workplace. For a discussion of this protectionist legislation, see Wendy Williams,
Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 333-35 (1984-85).
251. See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 200, at 860.
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harassment area is instigated by and grounded in solid evidence of the
harmful effects on women of sexuality in the workplace." 2 Sexual conduct
ranging from solicitation to sexually oriented language to exposure to por-
nography has been found to contribute to low self-esteem among women
and to perpetuate stereotypes that revolve around women not belonging in
the workplace. 3 Consequently, sexuality in the workplace can be used
and abused by men to retain their dominance in the workplace and to hinder
women from achieving equality. 4 In light of these findings, it is tempting
to promote the concept of a sexuality-free environment at work. Elimina-
tion of sexual interaction in the workplace, however, is not only unrealis-
tic" but, for many females as well as males, may not be completely
attractive.
It probably goes without saying that sexuality is an integral part of
human interaction. Sexuality at work in and of itself consequently is not a
"bad thing." Sexuality becomes harmful when it is used to hurt people
physically, to denigrate or humiliate people, to deny them their equal oppor-
tunity in employment, or otherwise to make an environment hostile or un-
comfortable. Conversely, an undercurrent of appropriate sexuality in the
workplace may serve a variety of positive goals."56 For example, some
workers may be stimulated to work harder for or be kinder to or otherwise
react favorably to a person for whom they feel some attraction. A certain
degree of emotional intimacy among co-workers may result from shared
sexual feelings. Everyday conversation may be more laced with humor and
good-natured teasing when sexuality is a part of it.
Despite these potentially positive aspects, sexuality has often been
used as a weapon against women, both physically and psychologically. The
physical exertion of sexuality ranges from rape and sexual assault to situa-
tions in which the male uses his greater strength to pressure a woman into
an uncomfortable physical position, such as coming up behind her, brushing
252. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 9, at 1204-09; Estrich, supra note 200, at 858-61; Levy,
supra note 159, at 42-49.
253. See Abrams, supra note 9, at 1204-09; Levy, supra note 159, at 42-49. For a general
discussion of the effects of sex stereotyping on women in the workplace, see Mary F. Radford, Sex
Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41 HASMNGs L.J. 471,486-503
(1990).
254. See Abrams, supra note 9, at 1204-09; Levy, supra note 159, at 42-49.
255. Professor Estrich, although she would condone a rule that would prohibit sexual relations
in the workplace, agrees also that "[mien and women could, of course, violate the rule." Estrich,
supra note 200, at 860. She finds the rule justified, however, because "the power to complain,
once in the hands of the less powerful, might well 'chill' sexual relations by evening the balance
of power between the two." Id.
256. As will be developed in a later article, this author is not nearly as optimistic about the
appropriateness of sexuality in a school rather than a work environment, particularly when the
interactions are between teachers and students.
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up against her, or locking her, even briefly, in his arms. As a psychological
weapon, sexuality is at times even more insidious in that it is more difficult
to recognize and, consequently, to defend against. Some men play on wo-
men's sexual needs by giving attention or affection only when the woman
responds as "a woman should" (that is, in a humble and obedient manner).
Other men prey on women's insecurities about their physical features, exag-
gerating what they deem to be faults and constantly emphasizing that a
woman's worth is directly dependent upon her features. Some men with a
word can make a woman self-conscious about the length of her skirt or the
color of her stockings. Men can exert a subtle influence by their own free
use of sexual remarks and innuendo coupled with either a deliberate disap-
proval of or an overly erotic reaction to women who do the same thing.
Sometimes the greatest power play is the one in which our male-dominated
society takes advantage of a woman's guilt about having any sexual feel-
ings at all.
The game of sexuality is not really the problem. The problem for wo-
men is that the game is played by men's rules. For example, one of the
most harmful ways in which sexuality affects women in the workplace re-
suits from the double standard with which it is applied. A man who sleeps
with his secretary may be admired by his cohorts for his "luck" while a
woman who sleeps with her boss may be derogatorily referred to as some-
one who can not succeed in any other way. A man who flirts with many
women may be viewed as cute or funny or mildly irritating, while a woman
who flirts with many men may be viewed as a tease or, worse still, "fair
game." A man can slap a male co-worker on the rear end after the company
softball game and have his conduct viewed as normal; if a woman does the
same thing, some male may try to turn the encounter into a sexual one. For
many men, sexuality is a source of power; for many women, it is a source
of humiliation and pain.
One way to deal with the harm caused by power-oriented sexual con-
duct is to attempt to eliminate sexuality completely from the workplace.z 7
Another possibility is to disarm those who would abuse it by holding them
liable for not determining in advance whether their conduct is acceptable to
the person toward whom they direct it. The attempted elimination of sexu-
ality from the workplace would probably fail (absent draconian techniques
such as the firing of anyone who uses a sexually exploitive word). The
drawing of legal boundaries, on the other hand, is not only practical, but
helpful in reworking our cultural stereotype of women as the perpetual vic-
tims of sexuality.
257. Estrich, supra note 200, at 860.
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E. Other Potential Criticisms of the Proposed Paradigm
The proposed paradigm may well incite criticisms not only from those
who claim that it does not go far enough" 8 but also from those who claim
that it goes too far. The latter type of arguments may proceed upon several
lines. First, it may be argued that the proposed paradigm is not fair to ac-
cused harassers and their employers because they may now be found liable
for actions that had heretofore been acceptable (e.g., for sexual teasing of a
co-worker who had accepted that same type of behavior from other
co-workers). A prospective, rather than retroactive, application of the new
paradigm may allay many of these concerns. The new paradigm is not pro-
posed to snare unexpecting employees and make examples of them, but
rather to draw a bright line that may be communicated by employers to
employees. Upon receiving this communication, employees will know that,
from that point on, they must curtail their sexual interactions until they have
positive evidence that such actions are welcomed by the persons at whom
they are aimed.
The second line of attack may come from those who remain concerned
about the filing of frivolous suits by alleged targets who really are just seek-
ing revenge on employers for some perceived unfairness. In response, it
should be noted that the proposed paradigm does not eliminate the require-
ment that the factfinder determine the credibility of both the alleged target
and the alleged harasser. 59 It has been noted that "[s]uch a credibility
judgment is usually unavoidable because sexual advances are not likely to
be made in front of witnesses."26 The difficulties inherent in this credibil-
ity determination, including the danger that some plaintiffs will be lying,
are not resolved by the proposed paradigm. Some easing of these difficul-
ties may be offered, however, by the clear requirement of the proposed
paradigm that the alleged harasser not proceed without objective indications
of welcomeness. The murkiness involved in current cases is often the result
of the requirement that the plaintiff prove a negative-that is, prove that she
did not welcome certain conduct. This requirement asks factfinders to
delve into the recesses of the target's psyche and attempt to reenact her state
of mind at the time the actions were taking place, as well as to determine
whether her own actions were consistent with that state of mind. The pro-
posed paradigm simplifies the facffinding phase to the extent that it directs
factfmders to look for the same type of objectively provable evidence that a
potential harasser should seek before he begins or continues his sexual
advances.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 236-55.
259. For a discussion of the factfinding difficulties associated with sexual harassment cases,
see supra text accompanying notes 95-130.
260. Sur.ivAN, Er AL., supra note 37, at 360.
[Vol. 72
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Those concerned with the potential for frivolous sexual harassment
claims may also argue that requiring the harasser to prove the welcomeness
of his conduct is tantamount to assuming him "guilty until proven inno-
cent." This argument ignores the basis of a Title VII claim. Title VII is
not a criminal statute. Title VII is designed to prohibit employers from
engaging in unlawful employment practices.261 A finding of sexual harass-
ment is not aimed at punishing the alleged harasser, but instead at discour-
aging employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of
gender.262 The proposed paradigm would again give employers clear gui-
dance as to how to instruct their employees to treat other employees.263
Finally, some may argue that requiring an employee to ascertain for
sure that his conduct is welcome before proceeding further would take the
"romance" and spontaneity out of personal interactions. The proposed par-
adigm is designed to affect employee interactions at work, not in the social
realm. Persons at work logically expect that their actions will be subject to
certain restrictions. 2 4 Many of these restrictions are designed to maintain a
working environment that will increase the productivity of all the work-
ers.2 65 To the degree the proposed paradigm places restrictions on an em-
ployee's ability to engage in "romantic activities" at work, it does so to
protect the rights of all employees to work without distractions. As noted
above,266 the proposed paradigm is not designed to eliminate "romance"
and sexuality completely from the workplace, but rather to define limits that
respect the rights of all workers to reach their greatest potential without
unnecessary and unwelcomed interference from others.
F. Effects of the Proposed Paradigm
Shifting the burden of proof and narrowing the definition of the term
"welcome" may serve as an impetus for adjusting the behaviors and atti-
tudes that feed sexual stereotypes. Under the current paradigm of sexual
261. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
262. It is true, of course, that an employee who is responsible for his employer's liability for
sexual harassment may well lose his job. The interests of an employee who engages in questiona-
ble sexual activity at work, however, must be balanced against the interests of those employees
who are victimized by this behavior through no fault of their own.
263. For a discussion of when an employer is liable for the sexual misconduct of an employee,
see Sperry, supra note 10, at 942-51.
264. For example, persons working in a grade school might expect to curtail their use of
obscene language. Persons who work close to flammable chemicals might expect to be prohibited
from smoking and required to wear protective clothing. Persons who work in restaurants might be
expected not to criticize the food in front of the customers.
265. Id. For example, an assembly-line worker might expect to be required to be at work on
time to avoid disruption of the work of the others on the line. A receptionist might well be
expected to be available during busy office hours even if those hours coincide with traditional
meal times.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 251-56.
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harassment law, when a female worker dresses to go to work in the morn-
ing, she should consider not only the appropriateness of her attire on a pro-
fessional level, but also whether her skirt is too short, her high heels too
high, or her sandals too revealing. Under the current paradigm, when the
worker interacts with her colleagues and supervisors, she should refrain
from making sexual remarks in even a joking manner. She should not
touch any of her colleagues, nor allow any of them to touch her. Under the
current paradigm, when the worker goes home at night, she should still be
aware that her outside activities could be used at some later time to show
that she would welcome sexual interplay at work or at least not be offended
by it. In other words, under the current paradigm, the vulnerable worker
should always be on the defensive, must always consider herself a potential
victim, and must therefore be on her guard lest she later has to prove that
she did not incite or invite the actions of her harasser. Under the current
paradigm of sexual harassment law, if the worker encounters sexually abu-
sive behavior at work, she has several options: she can remain silent, she
can scream and hit the aggressor, she can politely but fmzly tell the aggres-
sor to leave her alone, she can file a formal complaint, she can make a joke
of the behavior, or she can reciprocate in kind. None of these options is
without risk, whether it be the risk of vulnerability to continued harassment,
of physical or professional retaliation, of damage to a professional relation-
ship that may be otherwise valuable, of being ignored by the persons to
whom she complains, or of a later finding that she welcomed the behavior
because she did not run away from it. In the long run, the target's choice of
which option to pursue will significantly affect her chances of bringing a
successful action for sexual harassment. As should be fairly obvious, the
current paradigm continues to make sexual harassment the worker's prob-
lem and to base her chances of success on her own willingness to accept
certain risks. In addition to that, the current paradigm allows courts to in-
quire into not only those actions that the target takes or does not take in
direct response to the harassment, but also her interactions with other
co-workers and even with people outside work.
Under the paradigm suggested in this Article, the target of sexual har-
assment still has the same options when confronted by harassing behavior.
The dramatic difference is that her chances of a successful suit no longer
depend on her reluctance or willingness to respond or her interactions with
people other than the harasser. If the target remains silent, makes a joke,
mildly but pleasantly refuses, or reciprocates with a biting comment that
may include a sexual innuendo, these responses do not jeopardize her claim
that she was subjected to actionable sexual harassment. Furthermore, if she
chooses not to file a complaint immediately out of fear of retaliation or loss
of privacy or even of hurting her harasser, she will not later be told that she
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forfeited her right to say she did not welcome the harassment. If she flirts
with one co-worker during a coffee break, she will not later be told by a
court that the evidence shows that she welcomed sexual conduct by a differ-
ent co-worker. If she engages in sexual banter with one co-worker, she will
not later be found to have solicited such banter from all her other col-
leagues. If she chooses to engage in spouse-swapping or stripping or sell-
ing sex or simply having more than one sex partner outside work, she will
not later be told that her non-work activities are relevant to whether she
invited sexual advances while on the job. Her right to privacy will be pro-
tected. The only circumstance under which her conduct, as opposed to the
conduct of the harasser, will be scrutinized is if she freely, actively, and
directly solicited or affirmatively consented to the sexual conduct of the
alleged harasser.
A reallocation of the burden of proof and a narrowed definition of the
term "welcomeness," if properly communicated by employers and
respected by the courts, could contribute to a transformation in behavior
and attitudes in the workplace.267 If the suggested paradigm is adopted by
the courts and employers do an adequate job of educating their workers,
two other consequences should ensue. First, potential harassers will know
that they may later be called upon to give evidence of affirmative acts on
the part of their targets which prove that the harasser's conduct was wel-
comed. Potential harassers will learn that they will not be able to suggest
that silence or pleasant refusals were actually mere masks of consent by the
target. They will know that the fact that they (mis)interpreted a short skirt,
an interchange of jokes between two other parties, or even knowledge about
a target's outside sexual activities as an invitation or consent will never in
itself be adequate to show welcomeness.
The second additional consequence of adopting the proposed para-
digm-a consequence that probably will occur much more slowly-is that
potential targets of sexual harassment will learn that they do have control
over their lives at work. They will learn that they can report incidents of
sexual harassment without fear that their private lives will be exposed or
that their every move at work will be scrutinized. They will learn not to
267. This effect could occur despite Judge Newblatt's admonition that Title VII is not meant
to have the effect of transforming the workplace:
Indeed, it cannot be seriously disputed that in some work environments, humor and
language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie
magazines may abound. Title VII was not meant to-nor can-change this. It must
never be forgotten that Title VII is the federal court mainstay in the struggle for equal
employment opportunity for the female workers of America. But it is quite different to
claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a magical transfornation in the social
mores of American workers.
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
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blame themselves because they will find that the system does not blame
them when their mode of attire or speech happens to spark egregious behav-
ior from an observer. They will learn that they can engage in sexually ori-
ented interactions with chosen individuals without being told they have
invited the rest of the office to seduce them. For women as well as men,
sexual activity will be a chosen activity; any activity that they do not solicit
or to which they do not consent will not be considered consensual sex but
rather actionable harassment.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the simple description of your mother's party indicates, the process
of distinguishing welcome from unwelcome sexual conduct is not a tremen-
dously difficult one. What has been rather astounding to date is that the
Supreme Court, the EEOC, and some lower federal courts have allowed
themselves to be guided by stereotypes about social interaction rather than
by realities that are readily observable. Currently, a plaintiff in a sexual
harassment case bears the burden of proving a negative-that the conduct
to which she was subjected was not welcomed by her. The rationale for this
approach is that, because sexual interplay in the workplace is often ambigu-
ous, the legal system should include protections against those who "inno-
centiy" engage in sexual conduct.
The proposed paradigm provides that same protection, in that it gives
an alleged harasser the chance to prove his "innocence." More importantly,
however, the proposed paradigm helps to shift the focus of sexual harass-
ment cases from the target of the harassment to the aggressor. Under the
proposed approach, the notion that "she asked for it" must be positively
proved-it will not be assumed. Furthermore, the scope of her "asking"
will be limited to interactions between the target and the aggressor. A tar-
get's choices as to dress, lifestyle, or interactions with other workers will
not be deemed a waiver of her right not to be harassed. The new paradigm
does not attempt to eliminate workplace sexuality entirely; instead it be-
stows on all workers an enforceable right to accept or reject it.
The suggested paradigm is not designed to banish sexuality from the
workplace but rather to keep it in its place. The overriding goal is to allow
workers to choose when and if they want to engage in sexual conduct in the
workplace, be it an affair with a superior or merely sexually oriented ban-
tering. Any sexual interplay that is not chosen by workers becomes
grounds for a cause of action, the investigation of which will not result in
further incrimination of the target.
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